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Introduction 
American environmental literature claims that global sustainability and the ethic 
of earthly care are humanist issues.  From the early examples of Henry David Thoreau 
and John Muir, we see classic environmental authors urging humanity to reconnect with 
nature.  More recently, however, environmental literature has received a post-humanist 
makeover partly through its integration with feminism.  Born of the last thirty years, 
ecofeminist literature combines the environmentalist focus on reconnection with nature 
with the feminist focus on gender equality.  This combination produces a feminist view 
on environmentalism that is concerned with the degradation of both earth and its peoples.   
Ecofeminism foregoes a back-to-nature approach and instead incites a wake-up 
call to humanity.  Ecofeminist writers insist that there lies an inherent “connection 
between the subjugation of women (or a group of people) and the domination of nature” 
(Warren x).  If we solve one issue, we can solve the other; this goal has become the 
ecofeminists’ ultimate pursuit.  Through handling topics such as gender, power, sexuality, 
and nature, ecofeminist fiction develops narratives that expose our wrong turns and poor 
decisions concerning the development of our societies and our treatment of both land and 
people.  Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood are two fiction writers who have 
produced important ecofeminist discussion through their novels.   By analyzing Ursula K. 
Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness (1969) and The Dispossessed (1974) as well as 
Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing (1972) and Oryx and Crake (2003), this thesis shows how 
these authors both contributed to the growth of ecofeminism and how their works remain 
an important part of the ecofeminist dialogue.   
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There are nearly as many theories about the beginnings of North American 
ecofeminism as there are books on the subject.  But most ecofeminist writers agree that 
American ecofeminism in the early 1970s was a response to the threat of nuclear 
annihilation and the damaging effects of war.  At this time, the United States was 
engaged in both the Vietnam and Cold Wars.  Believing that militarization and nuclear 
warfare were major contributors to the domination and maldevelopment facing the 
western world, activists in the environmental and feminist communities gathered at 
nuclear test sites in protest.   
Environmental activists at these protests argued that the harmful chemicals, toxic 
waste, and deadly intent of nuclear weapons made them the largest current threat to the 
earth’s ability to sustain life.  On down the fence, feminist activists rallied for the future 
of their children and against the androcentric destruction.  Ecofeminist author Noel 
Sturgeon, who was present at the Nevada nuclear protests in 1970, writes that these 
nuclear test sites were the meeting grounds for many like-minded activists looking to 
secure a more peaceful future.  She explains that “[i]n this political context, ‘the 
environment’ served feminists as a medium for the connection of critiques of militarism, 
capitalism, and neocolonialism” (145).  Converging causes like these resulted in a 
network of support and information for both activist groups.  Those in this network soon 
called themselves ecofeminists.   
From the start, ecofeminists were animal rights activists, vegetarians, war 
protesters, civil rights activists, feminists, ecologists and mothers of soldiers, all seeking 
to end dominance and destruction.  From these common goals grew a shared ethic of care 
and a joint effort against the logic of domination.  These goals became rhetorical staples 
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in the ecofeminist movement. According to Deane Curtin, the ethic of care is a synthesis 
of environmental ethics and feminist maternalism. It refers to an ethical model that 
suggests “the interests of others should come before my own,” the manifestation of which 
requires “empathetic projection into another’s life” (71).  The ability to view the 
degradation of the environment and the abuse of subcultures as inherently linked and as a 
priority issue in one’s own life is the basis for the ethic of care in ecofeminism. 
Along with urging humanity to make public matters personal, ecofeminists take 
special care in criticizing and deconstructing the logic of domination.  According to 
ecofeminist philosopher Karen J. Warren, the logic of domination is the logic of the 
traditional hierarchy which positions men and culture at the top, based on the assumption 
of strength, and women and nature at the bottom, based on the corresponding assumption 
of weakness.  Ecofeminists address the culture/nature dialectic that empowers the logic of 
domination in different ways.  While some ecofeminists find the woman/nature identity 
liberating, others find it confining.  This split in the fabric of ecofeminism has spawned 
criticism about the philosophy’s validity and utility, which I will soon address more 
thoroughly.  
For ecofeminists, the ethic of care is an obvious bridge between environmentalism 
and feminism.  The logic of domination, specifically, has resulted in unifying rhetoric 
from feminists seeking to make environmentalism an integral part of feminism.  To this 
end, ecofeminists argue that “an environmentalist perspective is theoretically necessary 
to feminism” (Sturgeon 190).  This argument posits that since feminism upholds the ethic 
of care and seeks to subvert the logic of domination, all feminists are thereby 
ecofeminists and contemporary feminism should work to incorporate environmentalism 
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into its philosophy.  This sequence of philosophical convergence, synthesis, and adoption 
is the foundation of ecofeminist thought.    
The environmental feminist discussion of the 1970s was originally called “the 
nature question” by cultural and radical feminists (Sandilands 6).  As a term, 
ecofeminism was introduced in 1974 by French feminist Francoise d’Eaubonne, who 
wrote that “this new global movement of feminists draws upon the ‘specifically feminine’ 
power to combat the ecological crisis and the systems of male dominance that have given 
rise to it” (MacGregor 20).   D’Eaubonne’s term eco-feminsime came to America notably 
by way of Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron’s translated New French Feminisms 
(Gaard and Murphy 8).  Eco-feminisme in the context of French feminism of the 1970s 
refers specifically to the biological role of women, as mothers who produce future 
generations, in a potential ecological revolution (Warren 19).  While d’Eaubonne’s 
specific goals do not correspond with “the nature question” of 1970s American feminists, 
those American ecological feminist authors and activists at the time found this term 
useful for describing their own movement.   
What we now call ecofeminism is the resulting collaboration of various aspects of 
both feminism and environmentalism.  Both philosophies developed their own divisions 
and subgroups which found their way into the ecofeminist discussion. According to 
philosopher Allison Jaggar, there are four different categories within feminism, all of 
which have influenced contemporary ecofeminism (Low and Tremayne 4).  They are 
liberal, radical/cultural, social and Marxist feminism.  In an explanation simplified for 
application to ecofeminism, liberal feminism focuses on civil rights issues; radical or 
cultural feminism promotes a pushing away from androcentric conventions and accepts 
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the association of women and nature as liberating; and social and Marxist feminism focus 
on social constructions of power and economic and legal domination.   
Many accounts of ecofeminism’s beginnings assert that “ecofeminism grew out of 
radical, or cultural, feminism … which holds that identifying the dynamics—largely fear 
and resentment—behind the dominance of male over female is the key to comprehending 
every expression of patriarchal culture” (Spretnak 5).  Certainly this thinking was fodder 
for early ecofeminism, but most ecofeminist authors also recognize the analysis of 
oppressive superstructures that comes from Marxist and social feminism, and the fight on 
behalf of subjugated groups that comes from liberal feminism.  The divisions of feminism 
are intertwined, building off each other and using similar rhetoric.  Therefore, for the 
purposes of a literary analysis of ecofeminism, it is more important to recognize what 
ecofeminism’s various influences are rather than decipher which came first.  
The environmentalist movement also has several divisions.  They are early 
environmentalism, ecology, and deep ecology.  Environmentalism is the older 
environmental ethics movement associated with the literature of Thoreau and Muir.  It 
remains rational, scientific and concerned with preservation and human connection with 
nature.  Ecology developed as a holistic approach to environmental ethics.  It values the 
connectivity between nature and humanity.  Ecology critiques Western culture which 
“centers on its anthropocentrism, and the placing of humans in the superior position over 
elements of nature” (Low and Tremayne 4).  Ecopolitical author Sherilyn MacGregor 
asserts that one of the main links between feminism and ecology is “women’s 
dissatisfaction with the environmental movement, in which male domination was a 
source of frustration” (25).  Feminists and ecologists seeking a more holistic approach to 
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the ethic of care found solace in the ecofeminist movement.  Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Naess first introduced and developed the concept of ‘Deep Ecology’ which “takes 
into account distant future generations, the Third World, nonhuman species and, at times, 
the biosphere as a whole” (Attfield 2).  Deep ecology is largely concerned with long-term 
environmental implications such as over-population and the damaging effects of species 
extinction.  Like cultural feminism, ecology is the division most accredited with the 
development of ecofeminism.  Since ecology is very much defined by its differences 
from environmentalism and deep ecology, and since the ecofeminist discussion has run 
the gamut from “back to nature” to overpopulation, familiarity with all three divisions is 
necessary for an in-depth understanding of ecofeminism. 
Composed of fragmented philosophies, ecofeminism has several different 
positions within itself.  Each position describes a unique approach to ecofeminism and 
each provides a specific use in ecofeminist analysis.  Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman 
Orenstein give a particularly straight-forward explanation of the three ecofeminist 
positions in Reweaving the World.  The first position views the earth as having intrinsic 
value.  According to this position, the goal of ecofeminism is to restore and preserve 
earth’s wholeness.  This view that “the Earth is sacred unto itself” has brought about 
several different faith-based movements surrounding the Gaia/goddess pagan traditions 
(xi).  The worship of nature is a reoccurring theme in ecofeminist literature, most notably 
including fiction and essays by ecofeminist Pagan activist Starhawk. This position has 
also aided the ecofeminist rhetoric in elevating nature toward spirituality.  
The second position holds that “because human life is dependant on the Earth, our 
fates are intertwined” (Diamond and Orenstein xii).  For many ecofeminist philosophers, 
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this position holds the trump card.  They reason that destruction of the earth means 
destruction of humanity and thus, for our own sake, we must care for the earth.  Although 
this is the least altruistic position, and requires the least amount of empathy described by 
Warren as essential to the definition of ecofeminism, it holds a great deal of persuasive 
power.  Perhaps that is its purpose.  Certainly, another use for this position is that it turns 
the ethic of care to an issue of social justice which “cannot be achieved apart from the 
well-being of Earth” (xii).  Rhetorically, this position speaks to human guilt and self-
preservation because it persuades us that our well-being is tied to the earth’s well-being.   
Finally, a third position takes the perspective of indigenous peoples. These 
ecofeminists receive their identity from their environment.  They may be indigenous to a 
particular land, such as Native Americans or tribal people in Africa who have 
identification with land ingrained in their cultures, or they may be people who have 
consciously strived to relearn their identity as part of nature.  Contemporary ecofeminists 
of the 1990s, which includes the “Southern Ecofeminists” of Africa and Asia, use the 
rhetoric of this position to analyze human relationships with technology, deforestation, 
and developing economies.   
One final philosophical division helps explain the growth of ecofeminism from 
the 1970s to present day.  The feminist debate over essentialism is such a large part of 
ecofeminist discussion that it has become a defining factor of contemporary ecofeminism.  
In ecofeminist philosophy, essentialism refers to the culture/nature divide wherein the 
traditional hierarchy associates men with culture and women with nature.  While this kind 
of essentialism describes the logic of domination, women of the 1970s attempted to 
reclaim this association and use it as a point of social power.   
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In the early days of ecofeminism, women felt disenfranchised from the 
environmentalist movements due to androcentric, or “male-centered,” rhetoric and the 
male-dominated culture of science.  MacGregor writes that “[a]s problems within these 
movements emerged it became necessary for women to assert their differences from men 
in order to achieve their political goals.  Among the strategies chosen for the task was the 
deployment of maternalist rhetoric” (MacGregor 25).  This strain of ecofeminist thought 
supports the idea that women are more in tuned with nature than men and therefore have 
a special role in the environmental movement.  These women were able to break free of 
unsatisfactory movements and create their own.  The ecofeminist mantra for essentialism 
is that there is a link between the domination of women and nature.  
Those who find this kind of reductionism confining argue that essentializing 
women as mothers, or as more attuned with nature, is a dangerous use of the same 
rhetoric that feminism has long fought against.  Anti-essentialist ecofeminists point to the 
long struggle of women to break free from the confining roles of mother and wife.  In 
particular these ecofeminists fear the creation of “a new version of biological 
determinism that privileges women’s relationship to nonhuman nature” (Lahar 11).  Since 
the tradition of domination relies on determinism to socially stratify men and women, 
anti-essentialists assert that adopting essentialist rhetoric places women back in 
women/nature trap where gender differences justify subjugation.  Anti-essentialists 
choose the ecofeminist position that there is an inherent link between subjugated people 
and nature.  Anti-essentialists reason that ecofeminism should be useful for analyzing all 
types of domination, not just the domination of women. 
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Speculative literature has an important role in the development of ecofeminism.  
Although some influential ecofeminist literature was written before d’Eaubonne coined 
eco-feminisme in 1974, the development of ecofeminist literary criticism is relatively 
recent.  Gretta Gaard and Patrick Murphy write that it was not until the 1990s that critics 
were “beginning to make the insights of ecofeminism a component of literary criticism,” 
and “discovering a wide array of environmental literature by women being written at the 
same time as ecofeminist philosophy and criticism is being developed” (5).  Murphy has 
based his research in ecofeminist literary criticism on “Ursula K. LeGuin’s famous 1986 
statement, ‘Where I live as a woman is to men a wilderness. But to me it is home’” (8).  
Murphy views this statement as a critical turning point in ecofeminist fiction and focuses 
his studies on the ways in which literature helped develop the philosophy.  Unlike 
Murphy’s research, which focuses on ecofeminist literature after 1986, this thesis focuses 
on an earlier, precocious ecofeminist literature that helped conceptualize ecofeminism 
from its roots.     
In particular, this thesis examines the conceptualization of ecofeminism in the 
speculative fiction of Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood.  Speculative fiction is 
especially fertile ground for ecofeminism because of its idea-driven plots and its tradition 
of utopias.  Ecofeminist speculative literature contrasts our current society with utopic 
ecofeminist visions, or else, hyperbolic anti-ecofeminist dystopias with idyllic 
ecofeminist utopias.  Calthleen McGuire and Colleen McGuire that “[w]e regard 
ecofeminists as pragmatic visionaries and feel it is our business to ‘activate utopia’” 
(186).  These idyllic utopias activate ecofeminism by creating alternative cultures that 
have made ecofeminist choices in their relationships with nature and each other.  
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Dystopias contribute by exaggerating maldevelopments in our society so that these 
cultural decisions are obvious social failures deserving of reform.  Dystopias also warn us, 
if hyperbolically, that the same kind of oppression and chaos, which many of them depict, 
loom as a possible fate for humanity.   
Ecofeminist speculative fiction has several themes that help identify ecofeminist 
literature and contribute to its philosophical growth.  For the purposes of analyzing the 
works of Le Guin and Atwood, the relevant subjects are ahistory, gender, androgyny, 
otherization, technology, and development.  First, ahistory is a topic that has many names 
and implications.  Ahistory as a term refers to the solution to the problem of androcentric 
history.  Speculative fiction dealing with ahistory tends to describe the creation of new 
cultures that deviate from older ones, the dawn after the apocalypse, new generations of 
humans, and other motifs of renewal.  Ahistory specifically attacks the maldevelopment 
and tradition of domination in traditional androcentric history.   
In fiction, gender and androgyny themes often play out in ways that undermine 
gender stereotypes, downplaying the practical importance of gender differences.  
Speculative gender bending also helps prepare readers for other such earth-shattering 
assertions made through these speculative cultures.  It forces readers to unlearn 
traditional gender for the duration of the reading lending to an overall openness to 
unfamiliar ideas.   
Otherization as a theme is literary criticism’s way of addressing anti-essentialism.  
Characters who feel isolated, confined, or “otherized” due to social duties or roles are 
expressing anti-essentialist sentiment.  “The other” is a feminist concept which aims “to 
reject the notion of absolute difference and the binary construction of inside and outside” 
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(Sturgeon 5).  Ecofeminist fiction often illustrates how insistence on binaries is 
dangerous and inaccurate, similar to the anti-essentialist’s rebuke of the culture/nature 
dialectic.   
Technology is an increasingly important topic in contemporary ecofeminist 
literature.  In speculative ecofeminist fiction, the focus on technology has shifted from its 
antagonistic effects on nature to its influence on human cultural development.  McGuire 
and McGuire explain that this shift is useful for identifying stages of ecofeminist literary 
development.  They write, “it is in the nexus between nature and technology that the 
authors most starkly demarcate the differences between seventies radical feminism and 
ecofeminism” (196).  Later chapters discuss such differences are discussed in Atwood’s 
early and recent ecofeminist novels.   
Along with Le Guin and Atwood, there were several authors publishing in the 
1960s and 1970s who are very influential on the style and rhetoric of the ecofeminist 
literary genre.   Authors Rachel Carson, Earnest Callenbach, and Marge Peircy provide a 
helpful timeline for contextualizing ecofeminism’s literary roots. Although not a fiction 
writer, Carson’s work is certainly part of the nascent ecofeminist literary movement.  She 
wrote before the emergence of ecofeminism and her works do not handle typical feminist 
issues of gender equality, birth control, and disparate pay, but many ecofeminist scholars 
still either mention her work or give her honorary status as a “recovered” ecofeminist 
author (Murphy 45).  Significantly, Carson wrote Silent Spring (1962) which changed the 
way Americans used pesticides and influenced governmental policy concerning the use 
of DEET, a highly toxic chemical found in popular pesticides.  
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 Silent Spring also draws a narrative picture of the connectivity between humanity 
and the environment.  Carson traced the decline in the American bird and fish population 
back to DEET and the companies and politicians who supported it. She writes “[f]or each 
of us, as for the robin in Michigan or the salmon in the Miramichi, this is a problem of 
ecology, of interrelationships, of interdependence” (189).  Precociously, Carson invokes 
the rhetoric of the ecofeminist position that views human fate as intertwined with the 
earth’s.  Of our relationships with birds, fish, nature and each other, Carson writes “[t]hey 
reflect the web of life—or death—that scientists know as ecology” (189).  Carson, a 
woman writing a controversial, scientific exposé of a chemical backed by corporations 
and politics, paved the way for women’s involvement in ecology and the literature that 
followed.  
Earnest Callenbach also deserves to be mentioned although he is not an 
ecofeminist author, or even a “recovered author” for that matter.  He made his mark on 
ecological utopian literature with Ecotopia: The Notebooks and Reports of William 
Weston published in 1975.  This short novel is the diary of protagonist William Weston’s 
investigation of Ecotopia, a country that seceded from America and covers the territory of 
the American northwest.  Weston reports on innovations of transportation technology, 
energy sources, gender relations, communal living and other such flavors of the utopian 
stock.  Callenbach’s technique of contrasting Ecotopia’s plausible innovations and ideas 
with Weston’s exaggeratedly prudish commentary creates a generous critique on 
American (and Western) society.  This technique of exaggerated contrast has become 
standard in the ecofeminist utopian genre.  
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Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) is mentioned in nearly every 
book on ecofeminist literature.  This is likely due to the consensus as noted in one such 
book that “[t]he most influential of ecofeminism’s roots was the radical feminism of the 
seventies … as personified in Woman on the Edge of Time” (McGuire and McGuire 196).  
Piercy’s protagonist channels two worlds, an ecofeminist utopia and a horrifying dystopia.   
A differentiating factor between the two worlds is their relationships with technology.  
The utopian vision embodies the 1960s and 1970s feminist hopes of using technology to 
further liberate women in the same way that the technology of the birth control pill is 
credited with jumpstarting the women’s liberation movement. In the dystopic vision, 
humans use technology for oppressive and unnatural organ harvesting projects.  Woman 
on the Edge of Time set the trend for the ecofeminist literary treatment of technology.  
This discussion continues to warn that we cannot embrace technology without 
recognizing its danger.    
 Carson, Callenbach, and Piercy show the emergence of feminism literature from 
its earliest inklings in Carson’s research and Callenbach’s standard utopian techniques to 
its literary speculative form with Piercy. Before Woman on the Edge of Time made its 
1976 debut, Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood’s early works helped set the stage 
for ecofeminist literature and philosophy.  Both authors contributed significantly by 
conceptualizing ecofeminist themes and expanding on ideas of power relationships.  Due 
to d’Eaubonne’s eco-feminisme coined in 1974 (which did not find its way into America 
until later) and Marge Peircy’s novel in 1976, some scholars are tempted to assert that 
ecofeminism began in the mid or late 1970s.  However, because no movement or 
philosophy can spontaneously appear fully formed, it is important to analyze those 
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authors such as Le Guin and Atwood who had significant influence on the ecofeminism’s 
incubation period.  An ecofeminist analysis of Le Guin and Atwood’s novels provides 
profound insight into where the movement is coming from and where it has gone.  
Le Guin is a long celebrated author of science and speculative fiction.  She has 
won the Hugo, Nebula, World Fantasy, and National Book Awards for books she steels 
with hard hitting social critiques particularly in the realm of gender and power dynamics.  
But most literary criticism that discusses Le Guin’s ecofeminism focuses on her writing 
after 1976.  As previously noted, Patrick D. Murphy has produced a good deal of research 
and criticism using Le Guin’s wilderness quotation as a departure point for contemporary 
ecofeminist studies.  Murphy writes that “The novel that balances and integrates ecology 
and feminism more evenly and successfully than any other I have ever read is Ursula K. 
Le Guin’s Always Coming Home (1985)” (238).  This tends to be the kind of reception 
her 1980s work receives from contemporary ecofeminist analyses. However, few 
ecofeminist scholars extend their research to Le Guin’s earlier novels, The Left Hand of 
Darkness (1969) and The Dispossessed (1974).  As this thesis later discusses, both novels 
contain critical ecofeminist ideas and provide necessary context for the beginnings of 
ecofeminism in speculative fiction.   
Le Guin uniquely executes her commentary on these themes through experiments 
with subjectivity.  Her readers must expand their ideas of identity in order to relate to her 
stories.  Protagonists Genly Ai and Shevek, of The Left Hand of Darkness and The 
Dispossessed respectively, are both displaced characters whose survival depends on their 
success in integrating with new worlds while retaining their identities.  The result is a 
flexible, borderless understanding of the self.  This is one of the ways that Le Guin fights 
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against the essentialist traps of early ecofeminist writing; she “rejects the possibility that 
dualism may be resolved by returning to an original state of unity” (Armbruster 114).  Le 
Guin’s refusal to let her characters arrive at one convenient identity becomes a standard 
strategy in the anti-essentialist discourse as well as for the otherization themes in 
ecofeminist literature. 
For the very reason that Le Guin was handling ecofeminist themes well before 
1985, it is necessary to “recover” or bring both The Left Hand of Darkness and The 
Dispossessed into the realm of ecofeminist literary analysis.  In the introduction to The 
Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin writes “The science fiction writer is supposed to take a 
trend or phenomenon of the here-and-now, purify and intensity it for dramatic effect, and 
extend it into the future” (i).  For Le Guin, this process typically includes gender-bending, 
social revolution, environmental consciousness and a complete turning on end of self-
identity.  Murphy writes that this method is important because “these stories are part of a 
project to rethink human/nonhuman and self/other relationships” (Murphy 234).  Thus is 
the goal of ecofeminism and so it is of these two novels.    
Margaret Atwood is an interesting match for an ecofeminist literary analysis 
involving Le Guin.  Both authors make the same arguments about essentialism, identity, 
and human/nature connectivity, but they take noticeably different routes.  Atwood tends 
toward speculative fiction featuring alternate cultures and realities, rather than the science 
fiction involving new races, species, and planets favored by Le Guin.  Le Guin’s novels 
focus on the dual dominations of nature and subgroups, while Atwood’s 1972 novel 
Surfacing invokes slightly more overt feminist rhetoric centering her narrative on the 
domination of nature and women.  In Atwood’s 2003 novel Oryx and Crake she takes up 
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the cause of dominated peoples as well, showing a progression of ecofeminist thought 
with the changing social climate.   
Atwood comes from a great tradition of environmental writers and, as a woman, 
her work consistently discusses feminist themes.  However, much of Atwood’s early 
writing does not attempt to combine the ideas of feminism and environmentalism, but 
instead treats them as two major, intersecting themes.  The protagonists in both The 
Edible Woman (1969) and Bodily Harm (1981), for instance, are females who “have 
accepted the morës of the twentieth-century consumer society and lived according to 
them, in many cases by directly serving that society” (Woodcock 15).  The protagonists 
struggle with their jobs, relationships, and choices. Alongside this struggle they also 
witness abuse of the natural world.  Surfacing is the exception.  It uniquely connects the 
oppression of women and nature when its female character becomes nature.  Through this 
perspective, Surfacing discusses pressing feminist and ecological issues and combines 
them through the eyes of the morphing narrator.   
Oryx and Crake provides a picture of Atwood’s ecofeminist growth thirty-one 
years after Surfacing.  Quite a lot has changed.  Atwood’s protagonist is male, and her 
themes reflect less of the women’s liberation sentiment of the 1970s and more of the 
nature versus technology rhetoric of contemporary ecofeminism.  Contemporary or 
radical, Atwood’s literary perspective has always been especially valuable for its personal 
and emotional reaction to all sorts of oppression.  Atwood’s contribution to ecofeminist 
literature has been her ability to show growth over a long and prolific period of writing 
during which she empowered many ecofeminist arguments.  This joint analysis of Le 
Guin and Atwood examines the growth of the ecofeminist discussion from two of its 
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earliest literary contributors, so that we who are currently invested in contemporary 
ecofeminist studies may better understand its roots.   
The first chapter analyzes Le Guin’s earlier novel, The Left Hand of Darkness.  I 
begin by examining the milieu of criticism discussing Le Guin’s use of gender and the 
ways in which both the criticism and Le Guin have affected ecofeminist literature.  In the 
novel, Genly Ai travels to Gethen, a world where the humans are neither male nor female, 
but rather they contain qualities of both genders.  As I point out, the novel addresses with 
a wealth of topics beyond gender.  Two of those topics that correspond with ecofeminism 
are ahistory and demilitarization.  I examine Le Guin’s innovative use of time and 
calendar to create a world without traditional history.  The removal of androcentrism 
from history is an important motif in ecofeminism, which asserts that history should not 
be dominated by one culture’s perspective.  Without androcentrism, the Gethenians have 
yet to invent war.  I also analyze the novel’s anti-militarization rhetoric and explore the 
Gethenian’s maldevelopment toward gender, history, and war. 
In the second chapter, I examine the logic by which Le Guin links environmental 
sustainability and social equality as connected social movements in The Dispossessed.  
Shevek travels between his home, an ecofeminist utopia, and the pre-revolutionary planet 
in order to open communication between the two.  Using this narrative, I examine Le 
Guin’s treatment of dominance through the contrasting cultures’ positions on possession 
and ownership.  I also analyze how Le Guin uses the two societies’ reactions to these 
dominance themes to justify or eradicate racism, classism, and sexism.   
 Departing from Le Guin, I focus on Atwood’s Surfacing in chapter three.  
Because essentialism is such a large part of ecofeminist discourse, and because Surfacing 
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covers the debate best of all the books in this analysis, I use this chapter to explain and 
explore this broad topic.  Atwood argues her anti-essentialist stance through otherization 
and anti-maternalism.  I explore the way that these themes have grown in ecofeminism 
and how they are now at the heart of contemporary ecofeminism.  
 Finally, in chapter four, I discuss the ecofeminist perspectives on technology and 
ahistory in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake.  Because Oryx and Crake was written three 
decades later than the previous three novels, this chapter also examines themes that have 
been present in ecofeminism from its beginnings and point out how they have changed 
with both ecofeminism and the political climate as well. 
 Ecofeminism has decried the logic of domination and encouraged a global ethic of 
care from the Vietnam War to the Iraq War times.  Some would say not much has 
changed in the American political and social landscapes.  Ecofeminism, which has only 
existed within this time frame, speaks to the contrary.  From the seeds of a common need 
for social reform between feminist and ecological activism, ecofeminism has grown to 
purport and inextricable relationship between social equality and environmentalism.  The 
following chapters seek to both further explain ecofeminist philosophy as well as chart its 
growth through time and literature. The various themes found in the selected novels by 
Le Guin and Atwood show how these authors continue to help conceptualize the goals of 
ecofeminism.  In doing so, these authors reveal truths about humanity and our 
relationship with the earth that no amount of philosophical text alone could achieve alone. 
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Chapter I 
On the Brink 
The Left Hand of Darkness has been heavily analyzed for its gender-bending 
characters and scrutinized for Le Guin’s use of masculine pronouns describing 
androgynous people, but criticism addressing other interesting aspects of the novel is 
lacking.  While Le Guin’s commentary on gender construction is thought provoking and 
relevant to the radical feminist movement, it is important not to overlook the novel’s 
other dimensions.  The Left Hand of Darkness is an ecofeminist novel and as such its 
thoroughly discussed gender criticism provides a window into Le Guin’s commentary on 
domination and care.  An androgynous world with no written history or war is certainly 
fodder for an ecofeminist analysis.  Therefore, by taking an ecofeminist look into Le 
Guin’s androgynous world (including the criticism thereof), we can also glean the 
formation of ecofeminist ideas on history, androcentrism, and militarization.   
Because Le Guin wrote pre eco-feminisme, her ecofeminist themes are defined in 
terms of what they are not instead of what they are. Experimenting with gender 
constructs is central to the effectiveness of her commentary on other social constructs, 
especially that of domination.  This experimental approach continues to differentiate Le 
Guin from other ecofeminist writers who have come after her.  In a widely studied 1986 
talk titled “Woman/Wilderness,” Le Guin asserts that all knowledge is based on 
androcentric constructs, including our concepts of women and nature.  She states, 
The women are speaking … And what they say is:  We are sacred … 
Listen: they do not say, “nature is sacred.”  Because they distrust that 
word, Nature.  Nature as not including humanity, Nature as what is not 
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human, that Nature is a construct made by Man, not a real thing; just as 
most of what Man says and knows about women is mere myth and 
construct.  Where I live as woman is to men a wilderness.  But to me it is 
home.  (162) 
Le Guin’s philosophy on domination begins with fear of the unknown. Androcentric 
societies readily link men with culture and women with nature because the latter two are 
outside of their frame of reference.  Le Guin follows human fear of the unknown to its 
logical end, which is that that what we fear we attempt to control.  In 
“Woman/Wilderness,” Le Guin reiterates the very foundation of ecofeminism:  that 
gender and nature are inextricably linked, and that the same logic of domination befalls 
them both.   This understanding of domination extends all the way back to her 1969 novel, 
The Left Hand of Darkness.   
 The discussion of dominance in The Left Hand of Darkness begins with gender.  
In arguing that Le Guin’s use of gender bending lies within the greater context of 
ecofeminism, it is appropriate to begin by analyzing a few of the most common gender- 
identity readings of The Left Hand of Darkness.  The first is that Le Guin’s ambitious 
invention of Gethen as an androgynous utopia is undercut by her use of masculine 
pronouns.  As an unreliable narrator, Genly rationalizes his choice of using masculine 
pronouns in his report with the simple logic that he had been doing it subconsciously all 
along; no reason to stop now.  He explains, “man I must say, having said he and his” (5).  
Some critics believe that these are Le Guin’s reasons for not “inventing new words to 
accurately depict her vision of the androgyne” (LeFanu 115).  However, an ecofeminist 
reading takes into account that this is Genly, the male protagonist, speaking—not Le 
Messer 21  
  
Guin—and that Genly comes from an androcentric society.  Le Guin creates an imperial 
convoy so apparently male that the androgynous Gethenians have no other descriptor for 
him than Pervert.  The story is told through his truth and as he states “truth is a matter of 
imagination” (1).  As if to warn you can take the man out of Terra but you can’t take 
Terra out of the man, Genly explains in the beginning, “if the facts seem to alter with an 
altered voice, why then you just choose the facts you like best” (2).  For many critics, 
blaming The Left Hand of Darkness’s shortcomings, flaws and unexplained plot holes on 
Genly’s inadequacy as an intercultural reporter is too convenient, but concluding that Le 
Guin “could not conceive of Gethenian sexuality without first relegating her characters to 
male/female roles,” is too obtuse (LeFanu 117).  A reader who misses that Genly is a 
flawed narrator literally interpreting an alien culture and language through his always-
masculine lens is a reader who misses the point.   
 Another frequent criticism of The Left Hand of Darkness is that Le Guin’s 
treatment of characters, especially Estraven, denies that “androgyny can be seen as a 
space of resistance that redefines the ways in which gender identity is constructed” 
(Fayad 59).  This vein of criticism focuses less on the idea that Le Guin does not employ 
enough creativity in the creation of these androgynous characters.  The complaint about 
Estraven’s character is that he is composed of gendered pieces quilted together instead of 
a completely new gender.  Of Le Guin’s choice in characterizing Estraven, critic Mona 
Fayad asks “can we move beyond androgyny as a mere merging of gender roles in a 
polarization of traditional oppositions (passive/ active, emotional/rational, left/right)?” 
(60).  Critics in this line of thought feel that Le Guin did not utilize well-enough the 
creative space afforded by both science fiction and androgyny. 
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One instance wherein Estraven seems restrained by the male/female binary is his 
first meeting with Genly. Upon meeting Estraven, Genly notes, “Even in a bisexual 
society, the politician is very often something less than an integral man” (15).  Estraven is 
at once the authoritative Prime Minister of Karhide and damned by Genly for his 
“effeminate deviousness” (14).  Le Guin (or Genly) seems to fall into the trap of 
associating Estraven’s powerful characteristics with masculinity and his passive-
aggressive characteristics with femininity. Critics like Fayad argue that a genderless 
world would not have these binary characteristics. 
   In answer to this critique, John Pennington suggests that “male and female 
readers cannot escape their own genders” and that The Left Hand of Darkness demands 
that “each reader must define his or her inner space where gender finds its own 
ideological space; the novel requires readers to resist a gendered reading of the narrative” 
(352).  The pronoun critics reply that responsibility for flaws in the androgyny narrative 
too conveniently shifts away from Le Guin; this time the reader takes the charge.  It is 
reasonable to make the author responsible for her work, but as Pennington asserts, “the 
text asks that both male and female readers become resisting readers, who must identify 
against their gendered selves and critique those stereotypes” (353).  In the great tradition 
of science fiction, authors and readers alike are challenged by the composition of 
alternate realities. Perhaps Le Guin meant for readers to notice how unfitting masculine 
pronouns were on androgynous people and to account for the same kind of pronoun 
misuse in their own culture. Deconstructing gender through androgynous characters 
allows for many other constructs to come under question. This is, of course, Le Guin’s 
intent.  
Messer 23  
  
 While one set of critics notes that Le Guin’s “androgynous” characters default to 
masculinity, and another scoff at the wasted creative freedom where androgyny is 
concerned, a third set asserts that her use of power struggles undermines the utopia.  
LeFanu praises the idea of an androgynous utopia for providing “a retreat from conflict, a 
retreat from the symbolic order and the construction of the subject within language, back 
to the pre-Oedipal imaginary order, or, as Frederic Jameson puts it, the ancient dream of 
Freedom from sex,” but she disputes that Le Guin succeeds at creating this utopia (140).  
Fayad furthers the critique arguing that “Instead of a search for balance and integration, 
there is a struggle for dominance” (65).   Those expecting Genly to stumble upon a true 
utopia and report an experience similar to William Weston’s will be disappointed. 
Particularly, this utopia falls apart as Genly becomes more sensitive to Gethenian 
power struggles.  Estraven’s indirect speech, the Gethenian value of saving face, and the 
recognition of social position and authority all grow from the Gethenian norm of 
shifgrethor which is, in itself, a power struggle.  Shifgrethor performs as if the 
participants are trying to lower a very heavy piece of furniture to the ground in concert 
and each is overly careful not to disrupt the balance of weight (or power) so that they 
neither receive more or less of the burden than the others.  Shifgrethor, however, is a 
superficial performance because underneath the appearance of equality exists an 
underlying hierarchy of social position and authority.  Fayad disagrees that the novel’s 
“purpose is to eliminate the ‘struggle for dominance’ through assimilation, and hence, by 
extension, through ‘denying difference,’” and suggests that the novel can be read as “a 
parody of the patriarchal need for assimilation and sameness, one in which the male eye 
is incapable of seeing anything other than what it wishes to construct” (65).  This idea of 
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the “male eye,” or masculine dominance, in The Left Hand of Darkness aligns with Le 
Guin’s ecofeminist perspective. The power struggles in The Left Hand of Darkness 
purposefully illustrate the destruction manifested by a logic of domination.   
 An ecofeminist reply to the novel’s gender criticism insists that Genly is a 
masculine interpreter, the reader is responsible for making his/her own critiques on 
gender construction, and that Gethen is an unraveling utopia wrought with power 
struggles. But a pure gender-reading of power struggles within The Left Hand of 
Darkness treats only one half of the novel’s whole commentary on dominance.  This 
assertion calls back to Le Guin’s remark about the androcentric society’s determination to 
accept only what it constructs or controls.  Remembering Le Guin’s words about 
dominant culture defining this dark, wild “other” as woman and nature, these terms 
become metaphors for all that is subject to an enduring dominant paradigm.  With gender 
analysis more than sufficiently discussed, it is important to investigate power structures 
in the specific context of ecofeminism.  
Along with subverting gender, The Left Hand of Darkness engages in several 
other tenets now part of ecofeminism, namely ahistory, demilitarization, and the ethic of 
care.  The novel especially assumes ahistory as a key component of its ecofeminist utopia.  
On the rejection of history, ecofeminist writer Stephanie Lahar explains that history, 
dominated by androcentrism, justifies human “maldevelopment” in which humanity 
begins to commodify people and nature (7).  For these maldeveloped cultures, 
ecofeminism prescribes ahistory, or the subversion of historical development that has led 
to domination.  Ecofeminism posits that departing from a maldeveloped history is an 
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initial step toward subverting dominant power structures that have pursued the 
subjugation, control, and abuse of nature and people.   
One prominent example of ahistory in The Left Hand of Darkness is the 
Gethenian calendar. On Gethen, the year is always One.  Genly reports, “Only the dating 
of every past and future year changes each New Year’s Day, as one counts backwards or 
forwards from the unitary Now” (2).  The Gethenian relationship with time is expressly 
ecofeminist as they do not allow history to determine the present but instead change 
history each year as dictated by the present.  Clearly, the past cannot be eradicated.  
Ahistory’s objective is to end cultural use of history as a moral compass with which the 
tradition of dominance is transmitted through generations of people. Without history, 
tradition cannot justify atrocity.  Gender, for instance, is part of Genly’s socialization—
his history and culture—and his perspective is relentlessly skewed by the trap of gender.  
As part of Le Guin’s thought experiment, departing from history and refuting gender are 
different means to the same end.  Ahistory, however, treats an entire scope of subjugation 
including that of the environment instead of focusing solely on  gender roles or the 
subjugation of women.  
In Noel Sturgeon’s account of the first ecofeminist Nevada nuclear protests, she 
asserts that demilitarization was an impetus for merging environmentalism with feminism.  
As a founding ecofeminist objective, anti-militarism is a tell-tale sign of an ecofeminist 
utopia.  Gethen fulfills this requirement because, as Genly clarifies, “I did not speak of 
war for a good reason; there’s no word for it in Karhidish” (35).  The states of Gethen do 
not war with each other though they may not be especially friendly with each other either.  
Genly eventually realizes that Gethenian pacifism is a ruse. He notes, 
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Tibe evidently was going to press Karhide’s claim to that region: precisely 
the kind of action which, on any other world at this stage of civilization 
would lead to war.  But on Gethen nothing led to war.  Quarrels, murders, 
feuds, forays, vendettas, assassinations, tortures and abominations, all 
these were in their repertory of human accomplishments; but they did not 
go to war.  (48) 
These alternatives to war are not ideal but the absence of war is essential to Gethenian 
philosophy.  Genly’s wry report of the war situation on Gethen criticizes the Gethenian’s 
pretentiousness. Genly uses the past tense when he describes how the war situation “was” 
on Gethen because on Genly’s first voyage Gethen had not yet militarized. This leads us 
to believe that his future knowledge of Gethenian political relations involves the 
innovation of war. 
When Genly first arrives on Gethen it is an ecofeminist utopia that is just 
beginning to maldevelop.  Genly notices that anti-militarization on Gethen may have 
more to do with convenience than with conscientious objection. Genly’s race also refers 
to the planet Gethen as “Winter” because of the constant snow and cold weather. He 
hypothesizes that the snow and winter landscape, which create difficult transportation 
conditions year-round, has shaped the Gethenian people making them slow moving and 
careful.  Genly reasons the Gethenians lack war because “they lack, it seemed, the 
capacity to mobilize” (49).  Not only does the environment shape the Gethenian people 
and not the other way around, but the environmental conditions also lead to 
demilitarization.  Christine Cornell suggests that as Genly forms these conclusions, he 
“begins to see that there is no final distinction between personal and political” (324).  The 
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environment influences both the personal and political action on Gethen, which has yet to 
conceive of war, signifying an ecofeminist utopia.  
 While ahistory and demilitarization promote departure from the dominant 
tradition, the ethic of care encourages the creation of a more conscious human culture.  
This tenet of ecofeminism promotes a caring relationship between humans and the 
environment.  One such relationship that exists within on Gethen  is the landscape’s 
impact on the Gethenian’s vegetarian diet.  On vegetarianism, Curtin argues, “The 
injunction to care…should be understood to include the injunction to eliminate suffering 
whenever possible” and notes that “in the case of killing animals for human consumption 
where there is choice, this practice inflicts pain that is completely unnecessary and 
avoidable” (76).   The Gethenians have little choice in food because the wintry landscape 
makes farming difficult and much of the land unworkable.  Even still, the Gethenians are 
vegetarian.  Genly reports rather dismally that “there are no large meat-animals on Winter, 
and no mammalian products, milk, butter or cheese; the only high-protein, high-
carbohydrate foods are the various kinds of eggs, fish, nuts and the Hainish grains” (10).  
Despite the harsh conditions of this planet, the Gethenians work with their land to farm as 
best they can, eating fish and eggs only when necessary.  Although the Gethenian society 
has technological capabilities, Gethenian cars are all electric and slow moving.  When 
there is much snow, there is little or no mobility.  Genly notices that unlike back home on 
Terra, the Gethenians have never thought to mine or raid their planet for fossil fuels nor 
have they ever conceived of genetically altering their food for preservation.  In 
relationship to the land, the disparity between Genly’s home planet and Gethen is this 
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ethic of care,  the consciousness and cultural decision to abstain from unnecessary 
destruction or suffering.    
 In 1978, Le Guin spoke at a Planned Parenthood symposium on the topic of 
“Moral and Ethical Implications of Family Planning.”  The insight she offers is this: “The 
survival of our species and of all higher forms of life on the planet now depends primarily 
and, as I understand it, very urgently on the limitation of the human population” (18).   In 
The Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin reiterates that the human population exacerbates the 
destruction of both human and non-human life.  Gethen is not perfect and is becoming 
less so all the time. However, Le Guin stresses that its utopian aspects develop from 
limitations on the Gethenian destruction of land and people.   The ecofeminist utopia she 
creates on Gethen illustrates the development of a human culture that has made many 
ethical decisions regarding the environment but that has begun to maldevelop in the 
treatment of its people.  Ecofeminism maintains that the relationship between the 
dominant group and the environment and the relationship between the dominant group 
and its people are one and the same; when one relationship goes awry, so will the other.  
For Gethenians, this means that once they create war, the destruction of their 
environment will follow.   
Gethen, then, is an allegoric semi-utopia, bridging many facets of feminism and 
environmentalism but is still far from ideal.  In her essay “Ecofeminist Theory and 
Grassroots Politics,” Stephanie Lahar appreciates the enormity of the ecofeminist 
challenge.  She notes, “Ecofeminism makes such big promises!  The convergence of 
ecology and feminism in to a new social theory and political movement challenges 
gender relations, social institutions, economic systems, science, and views of our place as 
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humans in the biosphere” (1).  The Left Hand of Darkness sheds light on each of these 
topics and warns that the delicate balance of humanity’s relationship with the 
environment relies on human consciousness.   
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Chapter II 
Revolution into Being 
In the five years between The Left Hand of Darkness (1969) and The 
Dispossessed (1974), cultural feminists continued to combine environmental ethics with 
feminist issues of social equality.  By 1974, anti-militarist sentiments were beginning to 
peak in the American public as the Vietnam War approval rating approached an all-time 
low.  Reflecting the quickening momentum of these social currents, Ursula K. Le Guin 
creates another unraveling utopia with The Dispossessed.  This novel upholds the same 
principles of gender, demilitarization, and sustainable living as The Left Hand of 
Darkness, but this time it emphasizes human nature as the impetus for social 
maldevelopment.  The Dispossessed is the story of two worlds of dueling ideas and 
lifestyles.  However, rather than contrasting a utopia and dystopia, a formula familiar to 
the science fiction genre, Le Guin refutes the idea of true utopia.  The novel shows that 
the human habits of ownership, excess, and domination can at best lead to “an ambiguous 
utopia.”  
The Dispossessed reveals a growth and balance in Le Guin’s ecofeminist writing 
as well as illustrates ecofeminism’s emergence as its own philosophy instead of two 
separate but complimentary movements.  By telling the story of an ecofeminist utopia 
gone complacent, Le Guin illustrates that sustainability requires constant revolution 
against those characteristics of the human race that tend toward possession, domination, 
and waste.  While reinforcing the idea that environmentalism and feminism are 
inextricably linked, Le Guin composes two contrasting social worlds whose tragic flaw is 
humanity.   
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The Dispossessed follows Shevek, a physicist, whose scientific ambitions prompt 
him to open travel between Annares and Urras for the first time in over two hundred 
years. Le Guin’s ecofeminist commentary arises from Shevek’s account of the contrast 
between Annares’ cooperative anarchy and Urras’ patriarchal autocracy. Shevek’s home, 
Annares, is the moon of the planet Urras and hosts an experimental, revolutionary society 
of Odonians.  The Odonians’ fabled leader Odo united the labor class on Urras with her 
anarchist writings, and led a revolution which resulted in a mass exodus to the moon, 
where the Odonians work and live according her teachings. Like on Gethen, much of the 
Annaresti utopia is superficial but began with good intentions. Shevek realizes that many 
of the Urrasti maldevelopments such as ownership, classism, and waste are beginning to 
emerge on Annares. Le Guin argues that these maldevelopments grow from the logic of 
domination, which is inherent in human nature. For Le Guin, wherever humans are 
present, there can be no utopia. 
Domination is a major theme in the novel involving motifs of property, ownership, 
language, and identity. Through Le Guin’s insistence that dominance is part of human 
nature, humans on both worlds come to identify themselves by what they own and what 
they control. The Dispossessed derives its title from the concept of property.  It is a title 
that summons visions of the ideal Odonian society—one without property or ego. 
Because the Odonians boycotted ownership they derisively refer to the Urrasti as 
“propertarians.”  When Shevek first discusses women with a group of Urrasti men, they 
are appalled to learn that the Odonian society practices gender equality.  Shevek 
determines that their disgust also carries animosity but decides that “[h]e had no right to 
tease them,” for “[t]hey knew no relation but possession.  They were possessed” (75).    
Messer 32  
  
However, Shevek becomes the real subject of this novel’s title when he loses citizenship 
on Annares and is received as an outsider on Urras.  Once he truly has nothing, he begins 
to fully understand Odonianism and the importance of revolution. Le Guin emphasizes 
that we do not recognize the destructive quality of dominance until we are affected by it.       
Le Guin illustrates that dominance is instinctual and that humans must 
systematically unlearn it in order to achieve equality.  On Annares, there is no concept of 
property or money.  All necessities are shared and administered by the Production and 
Distribution Coordination (PDC), which is the institution most closely resembling a 
formal government.  Shevek later describes the PDC to the Urrasti as “a coordinating 
system for all syndicates, federatives, and individuals who do productive work.  They do 
not govern persons; they administer production” (76).  Susan Storing Benfield notes that 
“Le Guin provides a vivid picture of those aspects of human nature that create hierarchies 
and bureaucracies even in the absence of formal government” (128).  When Shevek is an 
infant, he has an altercation with another child who wants to sit where he is sitting.  
Shevek protests and shouts “Mine!” The caretaker explains to him, “It’s not yours … 
Nothing is yours.  It is to use” (27).  Le Guin takes great care to communicate that there 
is no need for corruption on Annares because there is no money, property and no formal 
power.  The PDC’s main function on Annares is providing necessities for the people and 
appointing jobs.  All work on Annares is voluntary and everyone receives the same 
amount of food and clothing, the same kind of domicile, and the same amount of bedding. 
That the people of Annares begin to fail their Odonian ideals of equality and community 
can only be the fault of those who participate in the community.   
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Along with asserting that dominance is tied to human instinct, The Dispossessed 
follows the logic that ownership and control are at the heart of human motivation. Le 
Guin argues that it is human habit to want to own, dominate, and destroy.  The choices 
that the Annaresti make which lead them further from Odonianism are the same choices 
that Le Guin recognizes in American society.  Odo, a woman who saw the need to end 
the dominance of the “propertied” class and to live in cooperation with the earth and 
produce as little waste as possible, espoused a philosophy that is parallel to contemporary 
ecofeminism.  Le Guin creates Odo as a legendary figure who now represents a utopia 
unto herself, someone who made the right choices.  Of human motivation Odo wrote, “A 
child free from the guilt of ownership and the burden of economic competition will grow 
up with the will to do what needs doing and the capacity for joy in doing it.  It is useless 
work that darkens the heart” (247).  Since all possible necessities are provided by the 
PDC, all work is voluntary and there is no concept of money. According to Benfield, Le 
Guin “points out how narrow and incomplete our usual views of human motivation may 
be” (128).  We assume that humans want to own things and will work hard to earn money 
to buy things.  However, Le Guin argues that without ownership human motivation 
changes from a dominating and destructive logic to one that embraces community and the 
greater good.   
Le Guin also comments on how language constructs reality, an issue discussed by 
radical feminists who believe that defaulting to masculine pronouns helps create an 
androcentric culture. In The Dispossessed, the absence of possessive pronouns in 
Odonian speech shows a conscious effort to eradicate the concepts of property from 
Odonian culture.  When Shevek is an infant, his caretakers refer to “the mother” instead 
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of “his mother” and this same trend continues throughout Shevek’s account of Annares 
(28).  It takes only a few months of life on Urras, a world of ownership and laws, thieves 
and crime, before Shevek speaks the Iotic language with skill. Shevek notes that he “is 
accustomed to the constant use of the possessive pronoun by now, and spoke it without 
self-consciousness” (134).  After Shevek reflects on his life back on Annares, he becomes 
physically ill with disgust at the ease with which he adjusts to life on Urras, the economy, 
the idea of property, and the use of possessive pronouns.   The Dispossessed emphasizes 
that the subtle aspects of culture, such as the structure of language, steep humans in 
cultural norms so that we often fail to question if such norms are ethical.  
The Annaresti try to discourage self identification through ownership, but 
inevitably, human nature begins to unravel the communal system of shared property.  
During his last years of school, Shevek writes a book on the Simultaneity Principle, a 
very complex perspective of the time-space relationship understandable only to Shevek, a 
physics genius.  In Shevek’s first encounter with betrayal, his mentor, Sabul, puts his 
name on the book and postures as if the ideas were his own.  When Shevek confronts 
Sabul about this betrayal, Sabul accuses him of “egoizing” and argues that what is 
important is the contribution of the ideas to the community instead of whose ideas they 
are.  Shevek conceded without rebutting that if Sabul believed what he said, then he 
would not have troubled to put his name on the book.  Sabul is Shevek’s main source of 
distress on Annares and symbolizes the way in which the Odonians’ informal power 
structures are becoming corrupt. Shevek does not want to own his idea of simultaneity; 
however, he does not think it is right that some one else should claim it either.  This 
conflict opens Shevek’s eyes to other power struggles developing in the PDC.  As power 
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and coercion become realities in Odonian society for the first time, Shevek reaches out to 
the Urrasti where he can do physics without bureaucratic interference. There he will learn 
identity through ownership.        
The Dispossessed also analyzes the ways that the logic of domination justifies 
sexism and classism. Ecofeminist essayists Karen Warren and Jim Cheney explain that 
“[e]cological feminism is a feminism which attempts to unite the demands of the 
women’s movement with those of the ecological movement in order to bring about a 
world and worldview that are not based on socioeconomic and conceptual structures of 
domination” (244).  Since contemporary ecofeminism focuses on equality for all people, 
a shift away from the focus on equality for women of early ecofeminism, Le Guin’s 
portrait of Urrasti classism and environmental destruction anticipates the future tenets of 
this philosophy.  
Le Guin’s discussion of subjugated groups involves both women and the labor 
class. Shevek’s first encounter with inequality is to the detriment of Urrasti women. The 
first Urrasti Shevek meets are a group of fellow scientists—all male.  Shevek dines with 
them and their wives at an enormous party during which Shevek naively asks “where are 
other women?” (73).  A helpful Urrasti scientist says “[j]ust tell us your preferences.  
Nothing could be simpler to provide.”  Shevek remains unaware that the men are offering 
him a prostitute, having no reference for the concept, and presses on: “Are all the 
scientists here men, then?”  Incredulity and coughing ensues.  Pae, another helpful Urrasti, 
explains that all of the scientists on Urras are men because the women “can’t do the 
math,” have “no head for abstract thought,” and “don’t belong.”  He even goes as far as 
to joke “what women call thinking is done with the uterus” but admits that “there’s 
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always a few exceptions, God-awful brainy women with vaginal atrophy” (73-74).  This 
is Shevek’s first encounter with constructions of gender differences and sexism.  
Shevek’s personal history with women has taught him that they are not inferior as 
the Urrasti believe. His mother and partner are both brilliant women and top performers 
in their respective scientific fields.  Shevek’s earliest mentor and the most prolific, 
revered Annaresti physicist is a woman whose work the Urrasti scientists have all studied.  
When Shevek points this out, the Urrasti scientists are genuinely surprised.  Finally 
Shevek states the obvious difference between his culture and theirs: “Odo was a woman” 
(74).  At this, the discussion fizzles.  Shevek begins to ponder what kind of people these 
must be that do not allow women certain lifestyles or choices.  Daniel Sabia writes that 
Le Guin’s motive in this particular dialog is to establish immediately Urras as a 
maldeveloping society.  He writes,  
Hence, social survival and well-being require individual well-being; any 
decent social order must promote the overall development of individuals, 
and must encourage and protect their freedom, so they can thrive and 
contribute to society, fulfill social functions, initiate needed action, and 
innovate and take risks when opportunities and dangers appear. (192) 
The kind of unexamined thought and denial of women’s autonomy displayed by the 
Urrasti not only bodes poorly for the future of Urras but also indicates that these well-
meaning men are potentially dangerous. Le Guin speaks the danger of sexism in her 1982 
keynote address to an abortion rights conference. She reasons that anti-abortion people 
are not pro-life but rather pro-control over women and that this control prevents women 
from functioning as autonomous individuals.  About her own illegal abortion she resolves, 
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“I did what I had to do so that I could do the work I was put here to do” (“The Princess” 
78).  Le Guin’s criticism of Urrasti life comes from the belief that prevention of 
autonomy is a sign of a destructive society.   
 Although startling initially, Shevek soon finds the class systems he encounters on 
Urras are easy for him to accept—as long as he remains is in favor with those in power.  
Amidst the parties, the servants, and the property, Shevek realizes that the real motive 
behind the kindness of his hosts is that they are using him for his knowledge of the 
Simultaneity Principle.  He is disgusted and ashamed that he has been a participating in 
his own abuse.  Shevek seeks out an underground organization of dissenters in the Urrasti 
labor class.  He finds that the revolutionary organization has been rejoicing his arrival to 
Urras and sees him as a sign that another revolution is near.  Shevek is humbled that he 
symbolizes to them what he nearly forgot he was.  This illustration of Shevek’s unwitting 
participation in hegemony exposes human nature’s tendency to engage in oppression. 
Earlier, on Annares, Shevek feels the instinctual power of dominance when he 
first sees his newborn daughter.  He examines her, small and defenseless, and “knew 
consciously, as he had not done before what the attraction of cruelty is, why the strong 
torment the weak” (361).  Le Guin stresses that the capacity for cruelty is a human one.  
Shevek loves his daughter and is aware of his power over her.  It does not matter whether 
Shevek is a Urrasti or an Odonian; cruelty and oppression are human tendencies that we 
must work against.   
The Left Hand of Darkness and The Dispossessed both attempt to awaken their 
readers to the disastrous realities of our current relationship with the earth and the 
environment.  In both novels, Le Guin makes ecological sustainability part of the culture 
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inhabiting her utopias. In one of his essays, Werner Christine Mathisen analyzes the eco-
politics within Huxley’s The Island, Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, and Callenbach’s 
Ecotopia.  He criticizes these authors for failing to detail what a ecological utopian 
government might look like.  In spite of this criticism, Mathisen agrees with Le Guin’s 
approach in creating Annares.  He writes, “If the goal is to alter culture in a certain 
direction, then the medium of that transformation is culture itself.  Thus we should learn 
more about the social conditions and the cultural institutions in these three utopias” (59).  
Le Guin does not aim to reinvent government; in fact, the Annaresti do their best to 
abstain from government.  What Le Guin does well is target dominant culture as the 
institution deserving change and then conceptualizes her vision of an alternate, hopefully 
improved culture.  The result is a semi-utopia whose mistakes and achievements are well 
conjectured and worth learning from.      
In matters of environmental sustainability, the Urrasti and Odonian cultures differ 
most in their production of waste.  Conservation is a fundamental characteristic of 
Odonianism and is likely a reaction to the flagrant wastefulness of Urrasti culture.  After 
the revolution, the Odonians migrated to Annares and began to live out their ideals of 
equality and sustainability, working with their new world instead of against it.  In Odo’s 
manifesto, she wrote “Excess is excrement … Excrement retained in the body is a 
poison” (98).  “Excess is excrement” became the motto for the Odonian way of life.  The 
sterile moon on which the Odonians live gives them little opportunity for excess.  
Annares is a bleak desert land with no naturally occurring life except for small aquatic 
creatures surviving in the extremely salty oceans. This is one reason the Odonians keep a 
vegetarian diet.  Aside from pure utility, “strong social conscience functions as an 
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effective impediment to wasteful consumptions, and the people of Annares react against 
waste not only for ecological reasons” (Mathisen 64). They cannot afford to waste 
anything because the land produces very little; therefore, everything they make is 
reusable.  If an Odonian has an extra blanket or piece of clothing, he or she will give it 
back to the PDC so that the item can be redistributed to someone who needs it.  They 
have effectively eliminated all means of waste.  
Shevek notices the Urrasti relationship with waste aligns with their system of 
ethics. He first encounters trash when he is on the Urrasti spaceship enroute to Urras.  
The doctor attending to him throws away a piece of paper and Shevek asks, “What 
happens to the paper?” (12). The doctor answers, “Disposal, it gets burned up.”  Shevek 
is flabbergasted.  He confirms, “you burn paper?”  In all of Shevek’s thirty years he has 
never seen anything disposed of.  Towards the end of his visit on Urras, Shevek meets a 
Terran whose description of Terran culture is very similar to American culture.  Currently, 
however, he says “There are no forests left on my earth.  The air is grey, the sky is grey, 
it is always hot…You Odonians chose a desert, we Terrans made a desert…” (348). They 
discuss Urras’s equally dismal future alluding to such ecological stressors as air pollution, 
overpopulation, and the devastation of eco-systems.  Shevek muses that the common 
thread between Terrans and the Urrasti is their cultures’ relationship to property and 
waste. On Urras ownership leads to dominance and dominance leads to waste.  
According to Le Guin’s ecofeminist commentary, any exertion of power of one group 
over another will lead to waste and abuse.  
 At the aforementioned science fiction symposium in 1981, Le Guin asserted that 
“[c]onquest is not finding and it is not thinking.  Our culture, which conquered what is 
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called the New World, and which sees the world of nature as an adversary to be 
conquered: look at us now.  Running out of everything” (“World-Making” 47).  Le Guin 
expresses the ecological and social implications derived from human nature’s patterns of 
domination.  Through Shevek’s critique of Annaresti society, she asks that we, too, 
examine our own cultural history and remain vigilant.  If we can understand that we are 
the participants in our own social maldevelopment, then we can also understand that the 
next step is reformation. 
 In our case, Le Guin does not recommend the overthrow of our governing 
institutions.  The revolution she means for us is internal and individual.  On Urras, 
Shevek attends a museum with a newly acquired friend, Vea.  While admiring the 
artifacts of Queen Teaea,Vea “raises the important issue of internal versus external 
restraints on freedom” (Benfield 130).  According to Queen Teaea’s legend, she lives as a 
tyrant inside the heads of her citizens. Vea compares Shevek to one of Queen Teaea’s 
serfs because he acts morally without any lawful obligation to do so.  Shevek jokes that 
Queen Teaea belongs in his head, to which Vea insists that it is better to have her in a 
physical palace where he can rebel against her.  As an Odonian, Shevek knows that 
rebellion against the “tyrants” in our minds is the true victory.   
Le Guin insists that this rebellion must be ongoing.  When a mass of protestors 
surround Shevek, he is moved by their passion and agrees to give a speech in which he 
says, “You cannot take what you have not given and you must give yourself.  You cannot 
buy the revolution.  You cannot make the revolution.  You can only be the revolution.  It 
is in your spirit or it is nowhere” (310).  According to Le Guin, it is not within our nature 
to want to share, preserve, or sacrifice.  The logic of domination is cultural and historical.  
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If it was a survival instinct that instilled selfishness and brutality in our nature, then 
ecofeminism asserts it is for our survival that we must fight against these qualities now.   
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Chapter III 
One and the Other 
 Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood produced their significant early works 
just as ecofeminism began to emerge as a social movement drawing participants to 
academic conferences throughout the country.  The publication of The Left Hand of 
Darkness (1969), helped distinguish Le Guin as a writer who incorporates critical theory 
into her novels by challenging the power roles of government and gender.  Her later 
exploration of classism and property as themes of dominance in The Dispossessed (1974) 
shows the quickening social current of ecofeminism in the four years between these 
novels.  In 1972, Margaret Atwood published her second novel Surfacing, which placed 
her in the company of Ursula Le Guin, Marge Piercy, Susan Griffin, Alice Walker and 
others who were also working to combine environmentalist and feminist thought in 
fiction.  Surfacing, a title which seems to describe the building up or converging of these 
two movements, is noted by literary critic George Woodcock as “the first successful 
novel of a writer who … seemed destined to become a leader of the generation of young 
and talented writers emerging during the early 1970s” (14).  Along with its undeniable 
significance in Atwood’s career, Surfacing also signifies the development of the 
emotional and personal impetuses behind ecofeminism.       
Surfacing departs from the science fiction convention used by Le Guin of creating 
new worlds meant for critical comparison to our own world.  However, its approach to 
ecofeminism matches Le Guin’s use of utopias and dystopias, which less ambiguously 
note the wrong and the right paths of cultural development.  Later, in The Handmaid’s 
Tale (1985), Atwood uses the science fiction and utopian genres to discuss a much 
Messer 43  
  
advanced ecofeminism in a way that calls back to The Left Hand of Darkness and The 
Dispossessed.  Uniquely, Surfacing captures a pre-science fiction Atwood treating themes 
of environmentalism and feminism in a refreshingly emotional voice that prompts its 
readers to adopt the logic of care.  If Surfacing does not match Le Guin’s works in genre, 
it certainly does in theme.  Before Surfacing, Atwood published several volumes of 
poetry as well as her first novel The Edible Woman (1969), which explores the psyche of 
a woman who empathizes with her food and feels that to men, she is a dominated cut of 
meat.  In this, her first novel, Atwood explores the social station of women and compares 
the pursuing, containing, and killing of animals to the pursuing, obtaining, and 
degradation of women.  In Edible Woman, Atwood examines the negative perspectives of 
women that arise from upholding this theme of woman as nature.  Surfacing takes woman 
as nature to the next level, examining woman as other and the harmful social 
ramifications that are the results of designating a weaker sex.  The novel also heavily 
contemplates dialectical ecofeminism, which argues that to subvert dominance is to deny 
essentialism.  Finally, the novel posits that women’s link to nature is not inherent 
maternalism but rather the fulfillment of the caretaker role and recognition that human 
fate is tied to the earth’s.  Because Surfacing examines some of the founding themes upon 
which ecofeminist rhetoric still grows, this analysis sheds light on Atwood’s development 
as an ecofeminist thinker and helps elucidate literature’s contribution to the burgeoning 
and continuation of this philosophy. 
Simply, Surfacing is about essentialism: what women are and what they are not.  
One of the biggest criticisms of cultural feminism is its proliferation of essentialist 
arguments about the nature of women.  In its attempts to release women from roles 
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determined for them by patriarchal society, cultural feminism risks containing women in 
another box with other labels and other specified roles.  The feminist goal is to not 
pigeon-hole or label anybody.  In a sense, “[cultural feminists] avoid biological 
determinism but fall into the trap of ‘sociological determinism,’” which may be even 
harder to escape (MacGregor 7).  Contemporary ecofeminism, which grew alongside the 
postmodern feminism of the 1990s, now widely contends that essentialist arguments are 
detrimental to ecofeminist goals.  Margaret Atwood has this same premonition thirty 
years earlier.  Atwood’s exploration of woman as other is a reaction to the patriarchal and 
time-honored comparisons of women and nature that suggest both are inhuman and 
therefore impotent.  Le Guin also incorporates woman as other in The Left Hand of 
Darkness through Genly Ai’s reflexive distrust of Estraven’s feminine side.  Clearly 
Genly comes from a patriarchal society that others women and views them as 
untrustworthy.  Unlike Atwood, Le Guin’s critique on the social othering of women ends 
after making the point that the practice is used to justify abuse.  In Surfacing, Atwood 
writes from the perspective of a woman who is isolated by that presence of patriarchy and 
is experiencing the emotional trauma of othering.  She is caught in the basic social trap of 
essentialism as used by masculine consciousness: the two-level hierarchy separating the 
patriarch at the top with everything else, or the “other,” beneath him.   
The anti-essentialism in Surfacing makes the point that any label placing women 
outside of the realm of empowerment, whether the label is mother, artist, feminist, or 
professional, is limiting; to be allowed only one role in a sea of inferior roles is 
degradation.  Atwood begins the motif of woman as other by choosing to leave her 
protagonist unnamed.   As promised by this motif, much of the character’s anxiety is 
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brought on by her refusal to meet the expectations of the men in her life. As the plot 
reveals, traditionally “masculine consciousness denigrated and manipulated everything 
defined as ‘other’ whether nature, women, or Third World cultures” (Diamond and 
Orenstein x).  The protagonist discovers that designating the “other” is a large part of the 
dominant culture’s power.  The novel opens in media res.  The protagonist is in a car 
with her friends—her boyfriend Joe and a married couple, David and Anna.  They are 
leaving Toronto and heading toward backwoods Quebec to the isolated island home 
where the narrator grew up  This exodus from big-city life provides the characteristically 
ecofeminist comparison of two worlds.  On this vacation with her friends, the narrator 
hopes to find her missing father and recover the part of herself she lost to urban life.  She 
finds that the patriarchal interactions within the group are out of place on land that she 
associates with environmental cooperation and sustainable living. 
David is an example of a patriarch who has established the “original” hierarchy, 
othering his wife, the narrator, and the primitive habitat they are visiting. Atwood’s 
rhetoric is anti-essentialist in painting David as a ridiculous, awkward character who is 
entirely convinced of his role as natural dominator. The marriage between Anna and 
David is its own microcosm in which the severity of the power relationship and 
domination of Anna disgusts the on-looking narrator.   Anna discloses that David has 
never seen her without make-up, cheats on her, and forces her to take birth control pills.  
David punishes Anna through sex either by abstaining or by engaging in violent 
intercourse.  On this Anna says, “He’s got this little set of rules.  If I break one of them I 
get punished, except he keeps changing them so I’m never sure” (123).  David confronts 
the narrator with his misogyny in an awkward proposition for sex.  When she declines by 
Messer 46  
  
saying “you don’t turn me on,” he loses his poise and calls her a “tight-assed bitch” (153).    
Immediately she notes, “power flowed into my eyes.” At David’s outburst, the narrator is 
able to see clearly his charade of power.  It comes as no surprise that David has the same 
attitude toward nature that he has toward women. He wants to hunt and fish, which are 
acts of dominance, but does not know how to turn his kill into food, which is an act of 
sustainability. With the narrator’s help, David is able to catch a fish on his line but then 
asks the narrator to kill it.  The narrator prepares the fish as food so that she does not feel 
guilty for its death.  While David may be convinced of man’s biologically determined 
superiority in his male-dominated urban habitat, his true impotency is revealed after only 
a couple of days in nature.  
The protagonist refuses to laugh at David’s jokes or play along with the generally 
oppressive norms of the group.  As a result the group, ostensibly lead by David, 
designates the protagonist as other.  They do not help her with cooking, cleaning, 
gathering logs for the fire or any of the set-up and pick-up when the group goes camping.  
No other member of the party offers to help and perhaps it does not even occur to them 
that it is not the protagonist’s duty to serve them.  As she rises early and begins to prepare 
for the day, the protagonist notes “I carry the food inside and start the breakfast. Joe and 
David are up, Joe is sitting on the wall bench, face still fuzzy with sleep, David 
examining his chin in the mirror” (41).  She does not ask her friends to help or enter into 
a dialogue about her feelings.  Canadian literary scholar Ged Martin surmises that “[t]he 
narrator does not perceive herself as an agent of action, but as a survivor, a victim” (108).  
She has survived a coerced abortion and an abusive marriage and now feels victimized by 
her role as other.  She feels paralyzed in this role and so does not actively fight her 
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oppression.  At dinner, after the narrator turns down David’s proposition, he accuses her 
of hating men, stating “[e]ither that or she wants to be one. Right?” (155). The narrator 
does not answer David’s with-us-or-against-us ultimatum.  Anna seems to answer for her, 
saying “God, she really is inhuman.”  Anna, a victim herself, betrays the sisterhood 
between the women and completes the othering of the narrator, ultimately supporting 
David’s hegemony.   
Atwood uses the woman-as-nature theme in a couple of different ways.  The first 
way argues that the identification of woman as nature is not necessarily productive to the 
ecofeminist cause, and the second way examines women as earthly caretakers.  The latter 
will be discussed later in this analysis.  Woman as other grew from woman as nature, a 
common cultural construct in masculine consciousness.  The protagonist’s identification 
with nature goes beyond fulfilling a time-honored stereotype of gender identity and 
explores how the grouping of woman and nature is detrimental to women’s place in 
society as well as the environment’s place in politics.  Because the protagonist grew up in 
the remote, woodsy setting of this novel, she identifies with it as family and feels 
responsible for protecting it.  As she is increasingly disturbed by her friends’ presence at 
her childhood home, she begins to physically identify with nature.  While walking 
outside at night, the protagonist muses “[m]y tentacled feet and free hand scent out the 
way, shoes are a barrier between touch and earth” (165).  Some critics suggest that 
“because the body becomes a site of subjection for women, Atwoodian heroines 
experience a strong sense of unease about the body” and feel relieved to deny masculinity 
by identifying with a traditionally feminine concept (Parker 368).  While some cultural 
feminist readings of Surfacing insist that “this [thinking] implies a rejection of 
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masculinity incorporating reason, discourse, culture, and the mind, and an affirmation of 
femininity as the locus of irrationality, silence, nature and the body” (Ozdemir 66), 
contemporary ecofeminists argue that the association is not productive.  Espousing a 
connection between the domination of women and nature is not the same as identifying 
woman as nature.  The latter others her as a non-participant in culture and society.  When 
the protagonist does not find solace in her new identity, she becomes mad with 
desperation, belonging nowhere.  Surfacing shows how woman as nature is a weighty 
part of cultural feminism’s essentialist problems and illustrates how woman as nature 
does not hold a glorious Gaia-esque identity but rather re-establishes woman as other.   
 One solution to essentialism is role negotiation.  Dialectical ecofeminism is an 
anti-essentialist perspective that views people as holders of multiple, simultaneous, and 
often opposing roles.  For ecofeminism this means that instead of trapping women into 
identification with nature so that they forfeit any possible footing in society, people must 
try to move away from the idea of hard-set dualities.  Diamond and Orenstein insist that 
“[o]nce the critique of such dualities as culture and nature, reason and emotion, human 
and animal has been posed, ecofeminism seeks to reweave new stories that acknowledge 
and value the biological and cultural diversity that sustains all life” (xi).  Although 
dialectical ecofeminism as a widely discussed presence is relatively recent, first discussed 
in essays in the early 1990s, Atwood’s knack for predicting the future rhetoric of the 
movement does not falter here.  The protagonist in Surfacing juggles multiple roles 
unsuccessfully either because masculine society does not allow her to assume more than 
one role at once, or because it does not allow her to have two “opposing” roles.   
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 Atwood raises the question, as the narrator psychologically changes into an 
animal, is she changing or simply recognizing a deeper part of herself?  Fiona Tolan’s 
dialectical ecofeminist reading of the narrator’s transformation suggests that “[i]n 
relinquishing her victimhood, the system of irreconcilable opposites that she has set up 
offers aggression as the only alternative … the narrator recoils from humanity … and is 
faced with the uncomfortable fact of her own capacity for human destruction” (110-111).   
The narrator is at once woman, human, and animal.  She attempts to reconcile these roles 
by imploring Joe, her nice-enough boyfriend, to become an animal with her.  Joe is quiet 
and sad throughout the vacation because the protagonist will not return his declaration of 
love. As she slips into this Gaia persona, she is only able to make love to Joe one night 
when she pulls him out of the cabin and feels his “fur” in the dark and imagines that they 
are both animals.  She thinks, “He needs to grow more fur” (164). When Joe tells her he 
loves her, she tells herself, “he’s holding back, he wants to be like the city, baroque 
scrollwork, intricate as a computer, but I’m impatient, pleasure is redundant, the animals 
don’t have pleasure” (165).  That the narrator is unable to find peace holding multiple 
roles is a result of masculine society’s refusal to acknowledge them.  Masculine 
consciousness’s ability to accept or deny any claim as reality is an ostensible use of its 
power as the dominant culture.    
 The protagonist’s dialectical personality confuses some critics about why she 
refuses to confront her oppressors.  Most notably, Ozdemir points out that “[p]ower 
relations between men and women in Atwood’s writing, particularly in Surfacing, are an 
ambiguous theme because her heroines are never totally innocent or helpless victims in 
the hands of male oppressors” (63). The motif of silence Surfacing at once isolates and 
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further oppresses the protagonist, who refuses to answer or object when her male 
companions are taunting her or making lewd comments to Anna. Particularly asinine is 
the scene in which David tells Anna to take off her clothes for the movie the men are 
filming.  Anna refuses and David says “ just take it off like a good girl, or I’ll have to 
take it off for you” (136).  When David threatens to throw Anna into the lake she agrees 
to take off her bathing suit.  Once stripped, Anna jumps into the lake by herself.  David 
asks Joe if he was able to get Anna’s nudity on camera and Joe, perhaps sarcastic or 
perhaps not, replies “[m]aybe you could order her to do it again” (137).  Joe is a character 
who recognizes the harm of the patriarchy but is too socially brainwashed to do anything 
to change it.  The protagonist, on the other hand, silently watched this entire scene from 
the porch and—although it made her furious—did not defend Anna or confront the men 
about it.   
Dialectical ecofeminism argues that nothing is black and white.  Living in a 
society that relies on dualities is dangerous because this logic does not allow us to 
understand the nature of being.  Perhaps the protagonist’s struggles mirror Atwood’s own.  
Tolan writes that “Atwood charges both feminists and Canadians with perpetuating their 
victim status, yet struggles to reconcile her instinctual liberalism with a simultaneous 
belief in communal guilt and mutual responsibility” (105).  Atwood sees the essentialist 
mistakes in cultural feminism as harmful to the goals of equality but also understands that 
placing blame can be just as unproductive.  The protagonist must have these diverging 
traits—intelligence and impotence, sensitivity and dispassion—for Atwood to accurately 
depict the inward struggles and choices that give both men and women their autonomy.  
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Like Atwood, the protagonist confronts blame, which seems a necessity in every 
solution but which also has harmful essentialist tendencies.  The protagonist tries to 
assess why David and Anna are still together even though they appear to loathe each 
other.   She says, “I remember what Anna had said about emotional commitments: 
they’ve made one, I thought, they hate each other; that must be almost as absorbing as 
love” (139).  The protagonist does not blame Anna for her complacency because she is 
also dealing with her own.  One of the most difficult qualities to understand about the 
protagonist is that she both sees the oppression and plays into the hegemony with her 
silence.  Although at times this combination can be unnerving to readers, it also helps 
depict the protagonist as a true-to-life character.  Anna betrays the protagonist multiple 
times throughout the novel, sleeping with Joe and telling the men that the protagonist 
damaged their film equipment, but the protagonist does not pass judgment on Anna 
because then she would also have to judge herself. Dialectical ecofeminism assumes that 
all people contain what masculine society has called “opposite” traits.  Without the 
pressure of labels and the pressure to comply with one role at a time, dialectical 
ecofeminism allows failure, education, and progress, understanding that for a social 
movement and philosophy to work it must account for human nature, which is many 
things at the same time.   
 A final theme in Surfacing is the rejection of maternalism.  At times throughout 
the novel, the protagonist feels guilty about her abortion but reasons that because she was 
coerced into the relationship and pregnancy by a man she did not love, the fetus was not 
really hers.  She muses, “[l]eaving my child, that was the unpardonable sin; it was no use 
trying to explain to them why it wasn’t really mine. But I admit I was stupid, stupidity is 
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the same as evil if you judge by the results, and I didn’t have any excuses, I was never 
good at them” (25).  Following the anti-essentialist trend of the novel, anti-maternalism 
explores the role of the heroine who rejects the feminine role of mother and instead takes 
an unexpected route to ecofeminism.  As noted in the introduction, there are three 
different strains of ecofeminism.  The protagonist appeals to the third strain, which 
purports “the perspective of indigenous peoples, whose connection to native lands is 
essential to their being and identity, it is both true that the earth has intrinsic value and 
that we are also dependent on her” (Diamond and Orenstein xii).  This perspective, which 
is the most contemporary of the three strains, combines the first two—intrinsic value and 
earthly dependence—to make one dialectical perspective. 
 The protagonist rejects motherhood but remains an earthly caretaker.  This 
representation of dialectical ecofeminism suggests that while only women can give birth, 
both women and men can be caretakers.  This is an important tenet to develop in 
ecofeminist thought which seeks to convince humankind that all people are equal and 
equally indebted to the earth.  In the introduction to her book, Beyond Mothering Earth, 
ecofeminist researcher and political scientist Sherylin MacGregor writes, 
[a]ware that charges of essentialism have long undermined ecofeminism, 
these theorists emphasize that the link they make is a socio-material and 
experiential one: women’s mothering and caregiving work mediates the 
relationship between people and nature and thereby engenders a caring 
stance towards nature.  This rhetoric of “ecomaternalism,” as I call it, is 
pervasive in much of the contemporary ecofeminist discourse.  (4) 
Messer 53  
  
The argument that women’s main connection to ecofeminism is motherhood is to place 
women back into the bonds of biological reductionism, wherein they are considered 
birthing mechanisms instead of whole persons.  It is an important consistency in 
Atwood’s dialectical ecofeminist perspective that the protagonist rejects motherhood but 
retains the logic of care. Perhaps the protagonist’s only activism is caring for the earth.  
After David catches a fish, the protagonist secretly releases the frogs (their bait) into the 
lake.  She explains, “they slipped into the water, green with black leopard spots and gold 
eyes, rescued” (121).  That the protagonist never verbally or physically defends herself 
against the presence of dominance but suddenly animates when nature is threatened 
reveals a genderless, parental altruism toward the environment.    
While white Canadians are clearly not indigenous peoples, Canadian literature 
and culture professes they are humans who identify with the land and who have a will to 
protect it.  The development of this nationalistic, environmental pride may be due to 
Canada’s relatively peaceful history and long experience with British colonial domination 
(Wright).  The protagonist feels akin with the land she knew as a child and feels that 
masculine socialization has taken her away from her original identity.  Upon returning 
home for the first time in over a decade, the protagonist studies the land, garden, and 
wooden cottage as if rediscovering something she had forgotten about herself.  She traces 
the trails she traversed as a child, digs in the soil of her father’s garden and looks at her 
reflection in the lake.   Her indigenous peoples’ approach to ecofeminism is challenged 
when she encounters two men who she assumes are American because of their new 
fishing gear and shiny canoe that to her make it obvious they are catching illegal fish.  
When on a later encounter they reveal that they are from Toronto, the protagonist thinks 
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to herself “[t]hey are still Americans” (123).  This is a turning point in the protagonist’s 
consciousness.  She is unable to believe that these men can be both Canadian and 
destructive, although she only needs to look at her current company to establish this.   
The protagonist’s failure to keep a dialectical perspective that allows multiple 
roles and identities thwarts her ecofeminist journey.  Her judgment on the fishermen 
places her at an impasse with her life as a human who is at once capable of caregiving 
and destruction.  In a maddened attempt to deny the guilt of her humanity, she begins to 
psychologically transform into an animal.  Clearly going mad, the narrator describes her 
imaginary physical transformation: “[s]omething has happened to my eyes, my feet are 
released, they alternate, several inches from the ground. I’m ice-clear, transparent, my 
bones and the child inside me showing through the green webs of my flesh, the ribs are 
shadows, the muscles jelly…” (187).  This transformation is a contradiction to the anti-
essentialism found earlier in the text.  Whereas before the transformation she denies the 
masculine culture which identifies her as mother and nature, during the transformation 
she surrenders, running unintentionally back into the braces of the dominant paradigm.  
Of this capitulation Tolan writes, “[w]hen the narrator does succumb to the wilderness, it 
is not in triumphant identification with nature but as a reprehensible abdication of her 
social responsibility” (110).  By the end of the novel, the protagonist has unraveled under 
the pressure of labels, masculine expectations, and her own silence.  While she cannot be 
analyzed as a person of sound mind in the last four chapters, the protagonist reminds us 
of how harmful mindsets within ecofeminism can endanger its development and lead it to 
betray its goals.   
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Just as Le Guin leaves us with a call to action in The Dispossessed, Atwood warns 
us that we must be willing to make an emotional commitment to the ecofeminist cause.  
As ecofeminist literary critic Stephanie Lahar writes, “social projects must be both deeply 
personal and political to render transformative change” (7).  As understood through the 
various conflicts in Surfacing, a large part of the emotional commitment to ecofeminism 
is the willingness to relearn our understanding of identity and adopt a dialectical 
viewpoint.  In an interview with J.R. (Tim) Struthers in 1976, as Surfacing basks in 
critical acclaim and academic analysis, Maragret Atwood speaks candidly of her growing 
popularity.  Struthers asks, “[d]o you feel you are being treated too seriously?”  Atwood 
answers,  
I think a lot of the furor is extra-literary; that is, it doesn’t have that much 
to do with my actual work.  It has to do with the phenomenon of 
somebody my age, of my sex … doing all these different books, and also 
making fairly strong statements, and what you have is a conflict of roles.  
If I were male and sixty-two, nobody would bat an eyelash about a lot of 
this, I’m sure.  (68) 
Atwood’s personal experience with role conflict is expressed in Surfacing through the 
protagonist’s struggles. Atwood argues that to accept one identity is to surrender.  
Through the exploration of woman as other, dialectical feminism, and the indigenous 
peoples’ perspective on earthly caretakers, Atwood gives ecofeminism a much-needed 
evaluation.  She predicts ecofeminism’s growth into a dialectical mindset and offers good 
advice about the need to monitor the development of this philosophy.  Surfacing’s overall 
message is that the masculine argument “we are man and therefore we are not nature” is a 
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dangerous use of essentialism.  For Atwood, the answer is not that women represent 
nature but rather that humankind is part of nature.  Through this novel, she warns that if 
we fool ourselves into believing the human race is not part of nature then we will use this 
logic to abuse nature and degrade each other. 
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Chapter IV 
The End is Here 
Three decades after the emergence of ecofeminism, fear of human destruction was 
still a major component of American consciousness.  The threat of nuclear weapons in 
Iraq compounded by national outrage at terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World 
Trade Center towers set the stage for a new theatre of warfare.  In March of 2003, the 
United States announced its plans to invade Iraq and strengthen its efforts in a 
corresponding War on Terror in Afghanistan.  This same year, Margaret Atwood 
published Oryx and Crake, an apocalyptic, dystopian novel that warns of a future where 
technological and scientific advances commodify human life instead of improving its 
quality.  In her essay on the process of writing Oryx and Crake, Atwood explained that 
she heard the news of the attacks on the World Trade Center after returning from a bird 
sanctuary where she had stayed immersed in nature for days.  She explains that the 
serenity of the previous week mixed with devastating news of the attacks created an 
unshakable image of apocalypse and the fragility of humankind.  She says “the story 
came to me in an instant.  I had only to write it down” (Writing).   
In writing Oryx and Crake, Atwood captures the tone of the twenty-first century 
ecofeminist.  The novel focuses on the early ecofeminist concerns of technological 
annihilation and androcentric history and examines them in terms of present-day Western 
culture.  Technological annihilation is a concern that grew from the original ecofeminist 
demilitarization sentiments of the 1970s, during the Vietnam and Cold Wars.  By the time 
Oryx and Crake was published in 2003, ecofeminism and Third Wave feminism alike had 
begun to focus on developing nations’ struggles with technology.  Like demilitarization, 
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technological annihilation criticisms include concern for human and earthly destruction 
by nuclear warfare and the dangers of an overly militaristic society, but they also speak to 
the concerns of integrating technology with human life.  The early ecofeminist tenet of 
ahistory also morphed to keep up with the changing social climate.  “Cultural lobotomy” 
is a metaphor used to describe the ecofeminist idea of unlearning maldevelopments in 
androcentric culture. The environmentalists and feminists who once explained dominance 
and subjugation as the results of early human maldevelopment offered ahistory, or the 
social and cultural disconnection from a maldeveloped past, as a possible answer to the 
problems of power.  By the twenty-first century, criticisms of cultural lobotomy, or 
reinventing history by starting over, entered ecofeminist discourse. 
Similar to the protagonist’s friends in Surfacing, the humans in Oryx and Crake 
are culturally removed from the natural world and thus value organic life, even human 
life, very little.  Oryx and Crake is sometimes categorized as science fiction but Atwood 
prefers to describe it as speculative fiction, and in many important ways the novel 
speculates about the gruesome end to a rapidly maldeveloping society.  Upholding the 
utopian/dystopian themes of the three previous novels, Atwood’s ecofeminist 
speculations are illustrated through two contrasting societies.  In this case, however, they 
are both dystopian, one bad and one worse; the worlds are pre- and post-apolocyptic 
Earth.   
Jimmy, as he is known pre-apocalypse, or Snowman, as he calls himself post-
apocalypse, is one of Atwood’s very few male protagonists.  Jimmy grows up in a 
technologically advanced culture that is enthralled with destruction.  In adulthood, he 
witnesses his best friend, Crake, create a virus that successfully destroys the entire human 
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race and replace it with a new, genetically engineered race Jimmy calls the Crakers. The 
novel opens after Crake’s apocalypse with Jimmy, now Snowman, surviving hour to hour 
in an urban jungle.  Chapter two introduces Jimmy as a young boy living on a corporate 
compound with his parents.  The chapters alternate from Jimmy to Snowman until the 
two characters converge in the present and Snowman has to decide whether to remain 
alone with the Crakers or risk his life trying to find other human survivors. 
Like feminism’s third wave, ecofeminism has focused much of its recent social 
growth on the inclusion of all dominated groups, specifically those of the developing 
world, where the sudden imposition of technology directly endangers the land and lives 
of indigenous peoples. Oryx and Crake’s theme of technological annihilation is a 
criticism of Western culture’s dialectical relationship with nature and technology. The 
novel examines our want to incorporate technology and the want to be free from it.  
Technology operates as part of the logic of domination insomuch that, as a term, it begins 
to stand in for culture.  Instead of focusing on social paradigms wherein dominant 
cultures subjugate weaker groups and the environment, technology becomes the 
instrument of control, an extension man/culture essentialism. Val Plumwood discusses 
the Western rationale that humans are separate from nature, noting, “[o]ne key aspect of 
the Western view of nature… is the view of nature as sharply discontinuous or 
ontologically divided from the human sphere.  This leads to a view of humans as apart 
from or ‘outside of’ nature, usually as masters or external controllers of it” (162). In Oryx 
and Crake, Atwood speculates what happens when humans identify with technology and 
bastardize nature.   
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In their essay on ecofeminist utopias, Cathleen McGuire and Colleen McGuire 
provide a comparative analysis on Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) by Marge Piercy 
and The Fifth Sacred Thing (1993) by Starhawk, in which they write, “it is in the nexus 
between nature and technology that the authors most starkly demarcate the differences 
between seventies radical feminism and ecofeminism, specifically through 
biotechnology” (196).  Such is the difference between Le Guin’s 1970s novels and Oryx 
and Crake; both of Le Guin’s utopic societies, the Odonians and the Gethenians, rely on 
technology due to harsh climates, food shortages, and government or organizational 
needs.  McGuire and McGuire write, “[w]hereas Starhawk relegates biotechnology to the 
dystopic realm, Piercy incorporates it” (184).  In Atwood’s dystopic depiction of a bio-
engineering society killed by its own technologies, she adapts the post-Cold War 
ecofeminist criticisms (noted by Starhawk) to meet the expanding discourse on 
technology versus the natural self and the natural world.   
Disassociation with the natural self is a focus of both ecofeminism and feminism.  
While feminism encourages fighting social pressure to conform to the male gaze, 
ecofeminism explores the ways that altering the natural self creates a rift in human 
identification with the environment.   In Crake, Atwood creates an ecofeminist dystopian 
character who embodies human identification with technology. In college, Crake says 
that Nature and God are the barriers that keep human beings in order.  When Jimmy says 
“I thought you didn’t believe in God,” Crake says “I don’t believe in Nature either…Or 
not with a capital N” (206).  Crake believes he is in control of the universe.   
As a youth, Crake rationalizes away any need for a relationship with nature and 
instead promotes the idea that nature is flawed.  Using a technology metaphor, Crake 
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rationalizes murder, war, violence, and overpopulation as the results of flawed human 
nature.  He says “[w]e’re hormone robots” (166), meaning our natural impulses are 
misguided and destructive.  He vilifies nature for humanity’s imperfections.  Although 
Crake is Jimmy’s best friend, he is the ecofeminist antagonist, written as if inhuman.  As 
teenagers, Jimmy recalls, Crake was so desensitized to human suffering that in all of the 
public executions, wars, and child pornography they accessed on the Internet, “he didn’t 
seem to be affected by anything he saw, one way or the other, except when he thought it 
was funny. He never seemed to get high, either” (86).  
Cosmetics also contribute to the technological annihilation of nature in Oryx and 
Crake.  Atwood satirizes the over-reliance on cosmetics and self-improvement pills 
initially through Ramona, Jimmy’s stepmother who kisses him “leaving a smooch of 
cerise lipstick, he could feel it resting on his cheek like bicycle grease” (175).  At his 
father’s work, in the bio-engineered animals sector of the corporate compound where 
they lived, Jimmy perceives even faux-nature as awkward and shameful in the context of 
his world.  He muses, “[t]he pigoons had no toilets and did it anywhere; this caused him a 
vague sensation of shame” (26). Years later, as an adult, Jimmy works for Anooyoo, 
copywriting for “[c]osmetic creams, workout equipment, Joltbars to build your muscle-
scape into a breathtaking marvel of sculpted granite. Pills to make you fatter, thinner, 
hairier, balder, whiter, browner, blacker, yellower, sexier, and happier” (248).  Atwood 
writes Jimmy as the unwitting ecofeminist protagonist who is sardonically aware “[h]ope 
and fear, desire and revulsion, these were his stocks-in-trade, on these he rang his 
changes.”     
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Jimmy, as Snowman, resists the mainstream impulse to desire genetically altered, 
technologically perfected women even when they are the only women left on earth.  
Atwood writes that the Craker women “arouse in Snowman, not even the faintest stirrings 
of lust. It was the thumbprints of human imperfection that used to move him, the flaws in 
the design” (100). In  the presence of Crake’s version of perfect humans, Snowman 
recalls seeing DVDs of animals when he was a child which showed “mothers licking 
their young” and wonders “[w]hy had he found them so reassuring?” (10). Atwood 
implies that for all of humanity’s perceived imperfections, nature is still part of our 
collective identity, one that we will crave if denied.   
Atwood also comments on Western ecofeminism’s tendency toward what Noel 
Sturgeon calls “the Third World difference” through Oryx.  Similar to gothic literature’s 
Magical Negro, “the Third World difference” denotes an oversimplified Magical 
Southeast Asian woman, who represents all developing nation ecofeminist activists.  
When criticizing the bulk of published ecofeminist anthologies, Sturgeon points out, 
“[t]he discourse about Third World women in these books reduces all women in this 
category to rural village women engaged in subsistence farming or food gathering.” (124). 
Atwood describes Oryx vaguely as Southeast Asian, naturally beautiful, intelligent, and 
mysterious.  This description matches the dangerous oversimplification in Western 
ecofeminism on behalf of developing nation ecofeminist activists.  Jimmy obsessively 
questions Oryx about her past but assumes that she is fabricating her story to humor him.  
This is the same relationship Sturgeon points to when she writes about “the Third World 
difference;” Jimmy does not allow himself to see any truth beyond the convenient, 
stereotypical narrative of rice patties and child slavery, so this is what Oryx gives him.   
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In the world of Oryx and Crake, where self obsessed humans resent their natural 
bodies, aging, and are terrified of death, disassociation with the natural self necessarily 
lends to disassociation with the natural world.  As a child, Jimmy was told “ducks were 
only like pictures, they weren’t real and had no feelings, but he didn’t quite believe it” 
(15).  Confused by the bio-engineered pigoons that were put to death because of infection, 
Jimmy’s father told him the animals didn’t feel the bonfire: “they were like steaks and 
sausages that still had their skins on” (18). Because the humans in Jimmy’s life live on 
corporate compounds and the only animals they interact with are bio-engineered hybrids, 
they develop a life-long cognitive dissonance between themselves and the natural world.  
Crake’s identification with technology is a result of growing up in this faux-real world.    
Crake eliminates the human race through bio-warfare.  He creates BlyssPluss, 
marketed as a catch-all supplement that turns people into the humans they want to be 
(more of Atwood’s self-improvement satire) and also secretly contains an indestructible 
bio-form meant to kill all humans.  Bio-warfare is a 21st century twist on the 1970s threat 
of nuclear holocaust and is literally the use of technology to turn life against itself. Crake, 
an antagonist of the natural world, uses bio-warefare, in the form of a pill sent to the 
major cities in every country, to attack the humanity and thereby nature that he loathes.  
Through this transaction, Atwood illustrates that the more disconnected from the natural 
world humanity becomes, the more we are in danger of technological annihilation.  
Cognitively to Crake, humans are like the ducks Jimmy’s father described, “only like 
pictures, they weren’t real and had no feelings.”    
Ultimately, Atwood shows that humans contribute to technological annihilation 
when we begin to identify with technology instead of nature.  Once we have convinced 
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ourselves that human essence does not lie with nature, then we allow ourselves to reject 
the logic of earthly care.  Crake and Jimmy’s childhood spent petting hybrid animals bred 
for organ harvesting and their adolescence spent laughing at violent, pornographic media 
desensitizes them to human suffering and renders them compassionless.  Jimmy and 
Crake are not concerned with those suffering in developing countries or even in the 
“pleblands” of their own country.  Atwood satires our present-day hyper-sexualized, 
violent media culture by creating a world where humans are self-obsessed but resent their 
natural selves—their inconstant libido, bulging bellies, hair loss, and wrinkles.  By 
creating characters that lack human compassion and resent their natural selves, Atwood 
illustrates how nature becomes the enemy.   By the time Crake has thoroughly vilified 
nature, annihilating the human race never even crosses his mind as a question of ethics.  
Along with exploring new concerns in the area of technological annihilation, 
Atwood takes a contemporary ecofeminist approach to the theme of ahistory.  Time is a 
major theme in Oryx and Crake, not only in terms of narrative chronology but in the 
characterization of time and what it means for the protagonist.  Early ecofeminism, which 
grew out of radical, or cultural, feminism, used ahistory to encourage a departure from 
traditional androcentric history and the creation of a new history, building a new system 
from the ground up.  These theoretical movements were useful for paradigm subversion 
in pedagogy, organizational, and interpersonal communication.  However, contemporary 
ecofeminism takes a slightly different view on history and time.  Oryx and Crake warns 
against the dangers of ahistory by illustrating what Brian Swimme calls a “cultural 
lobotomy” (15), wherein historical amnesia causes the Crakers to repeat the past.   
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We meet Snowman a few months after Crake’s epidemic.  Oryx and Crake are 
dead and Snowman knows no other living, natural human beside himself.  His watch, too, 
is dead although he looks at it often.  Atwood writes, “[h]e wears it now as his only 
talisman. A blank face is what it shows him: zero hour. It causes a jolt of terror to run 
through him, this absence of official time. Nobody nowhere knows what time it is” (3).  
In a sense, Crake has created ahistory.  His intent was to start over with the “human 
experiment” which he felt had gone horribly wrong.  Snowman’s dead watch signifies the 
obsolescence of time and human history.  He watches the Crakers, masterfully engineered 
by Crake, create their own history, peeing territorial lines in the sand, performing mating 
dances, and baring children.   
Oryx and Crake is really the story of Jimmy’s history.  The second chapter begins 
“[o]nce upon a time, Snowman wasn’t Snowman. Instead he was Jimmy. He’d been a 
good boy then” (15).  Like early humans, like the newborn infants, and, later, like the 
Crakers, Jimmy begins his history benevolently.  His early maldevelopment comes from 
his dad, who tells him “[w]omen are always getting hot under the collar,” (or rather, 
“women are irrational”) and, as previously noted, animals are just “sausages with their 
skins still on” (16). This is the beginning of Jimmy’s maldevelopment.  However rich in 
human atrocity history is, Atwood argues that humans need their history to have a basis 
for improvement and a reminder of what not to do.  The Crakers, oblivious to human 
history and engineered to have every biological chance at creating a better human society, 
engage in familiar patterns of dominance and maldevelopment within the first few 
months of their existence.  In their essay on ecofeminist ethics, Karen Warren and Jim 
Cheney assert that ecofeminism, as a living theory, relies on time and history for growth 
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stating “it is something both ‘situated’ … and ‘in process,’ emerging from people’s 
different experiences and observations and changing over time” (256).  Atwood argues 
that human culture has this same relationship with time, it is recorded by history and 
redefined through time. 
Instead of rejecting history, many contemporary ecofeminists look for answers to 
cultural maldevelopment in ancient wisdom.  In her essay on theology and nature, Carol 
P. Christ suggests that cultural healing begins with “[a] recovery of more ancient and 
traditional views that revere the profound connection of all beings in the web of life and a 
rethinking of the relation of both humanity and divinity to nature” (58).   Snowman’s 
perspective lies close to Christ’s in that he constantly searches his memories for comfort 
and for answers.  Jimmy’s relationship to nature has changed greatly in the recent past.  
He has gone from life in a sterile, corporate compound to life as an insect-bitten, 
sunburned, nomad.  Snowman chants arcane English words, mulls over memories from 
early childhood, and replays conversations with his mother, father, Oryx, and Crake.  
Without his past, he could not make sense of the present.   
The Crakers, who have no past, are confused about their lives, their purpose, 
where they came from, and more importantly where Snowman came from.  Although 
Crake did his best to exclude art, religion, and jokes from his Crakers, the Crakers turn to 
Snowman for an explanation of their origin.  In exchange for weekly fish dinners, 
Snowman humors the Crakers with stories of Crake as God creating them out of mango 
and Oryx laying an egg full of words. The Crakers begin to worship Snowman as a 
prophet.  Annoyed at the Crakers begging for scraps of history and pointing out his 
contradictions, Snowman observes “[a]t first he’d improvised, but now they’re 
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demanding dogma” (104).  Even though Crake insisted that “[h]ierarchy could not exist 
among them, because they lacked the neural complexes that would have created it,” the 
Crakers readily placed Crake in a Godlike, omnipotence category; below him is Oryx, 
and then Snowman, the prophet.   
To solidify his ahistorical utopia, Crake tries to rid the Craker design of 
“[s]ymbolic thinking of any kind” (361).  Crake says of the Crakers, “[a]s soon as they 
start doing art we’re in trouble.”  Their first symbolic representation is a scarecrow-like 
statue of Snowman which they erect when he leaves them for a few days to explore the 
area.  When Snowman returns, he finds the Crakers chanting, playing percussion, and 
worshiping a statue of him.  Riane Eisler argues that this behavior is inevitable because 
human culture is “[t]he story not only of the fashioning of material tools but also of the 
fashioning of our most important and unique non-material tools: the mental tools of 
language and imagery, of humanmade words, symbols, and pictures” (32).  The Crakers 
could not exist without mutation or authenticity of some kind.  The creation of their own 
customs, hierarchies, and mythology is a result of their need to narrate history, which 
contemporary ecofeminism argues is an important impulse in human culture.  Atwood 
concludes that because the Crakers were robbed the lessons of history, they are in no 
better position to create a utopic humanity than the early humans were.   Likely, they are 
in a worse position.   
Throughout Oryx and Crake Atwood maintains that annihilating the past does not 
improve the future while still acknowledging the usefulness of ahistory in ecofeminism.  
In her essay about writing Oryx and Crake, she states “[t]he rules of biology are as 
inexorable as those of physics: run out of food and water and you die. No animal can 
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exhaust its resource base and hope to survive. Human civilizations are subject to the same 
law” (Writing).  She writes similar words for Crake who he muses out loud to Jimmy 
“[h]omo sapiens doesn’t seem able to cut himself off at the supply end.  He’s one of the 
few species that doesn’t limit reproduction in the face of dwindling resources” (120).  
Here Atwood recognizes the argument of ahistory as a kind of logic that misses the 
bigger picture. This statement to Jimmy is one of Crake’s staple justifications for wanting 
to destroy the human race.  He argues that the world would be better off without the 
current model of humanity and that humans themselves are miserable and self-destructive.  
As a contemporary ecofeminist writer, Atwood intercepts this logic, that we must depart 
from androcentric history, and insists that we must use what we have—a history rich in 
lessons on atrocity—and build a better human culture from there.   
Atwood’s satire of the relationship between humans and technology shows that 
while humans control technology, it is our main tool of self-destruction.  Through the 
Crakers Atwood makes the point that, if we forget this wisdom, however condemning it 
may be, humanity will never gain the consciousness to produce a more sustainable 
culture.  Jimmy, Atwood’s every-human protagonist, remembers his past to stay sane.  
Despite the desensitization of his youth, Jimmy remains sentimental about memories of 
his mother, his pet racunk, and Oryx and cynical about memories of technology.  In 
Atwood’s dystopia, Jimmy’s survival is most likely due to his identity as a human and his 
refusal to forget.     
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Conclusion 
In 2007, ecofeminism faces many of the same political challenges with which it 
began.  Public approval of the Iraq War is at an all time low, and the whereabouts of 
foreign nuclear weapons as well as the issue of disposing the waste caused by our own 
has resulted in global controversy.  However, in its maturity, ecofeminism has also 
expanded to include issues of human destruction outside of Western culture.  The 
“Southern ecofeminists” of the developing economies in Africa and Asia have 
contributed a much-needed perspective on the effects of technology and development on 
the cultures and environments of indigenous peoples.   
Noel Sturgeon explains that the recent ecofeminist focus on the struggles with 
technology and environmental destruction of “women of the Third World” has forced 
feminists to reexamine the essentializion of these women.  She writes that much feminist 
discourse “reduces all women in this category to rural village women engaged in 
subsistence farming or food gathering” (124).  As the scope of ecofeminism expands 
outside of Western culture to examine problems of women and oppressed peoples of 
Eastern cultures, anti-essentialism will continue to play a large part in the future of 
ecofeminist rhetoric. 
The “recovery” of ecofeminism’s precursory authors for study within the 
movement helps us understand the context of ecofeminism’s roots.  Rachel Carson’s 
contribution to women’s pursuits in ecology is monumental and her rhetoric on the 
connected fates of humanity and nature is echoed in ecofeminism today.  The recovery of 
ecofeminist works published before the 1974 coining of eco-feminisme plays a similar 
role in contextualizing ecofeminism.  Ursula K. Le Guin and Margaret Atwood are 
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revered ecofeminist authors; however, their works that receive the most ecofeminist 
analysis are those published after 1974.  By taking an ecofeminist look at Le Guin’s The 
Left Hand of Darkness (1969) and The Dispossessed (1974) and Atwood’s Surfacing 
(1972), we gain a better understanding of the kind of issues that informed the future of 
ecofeminism. Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) gives us perspective on how 
ecofeminism has grown since its nascent stages in the early 1970s.   
Le Guin’s unwillingness to create sustainable utopias illuminates important 
ecofeminist insights into the logic of domination and its stake in human nature.  The Left 
Hand of Darkness deconstructs concepts of gender, history, and war in order to 
conceptualize a departure from the human tradition of dominance.  The Dispossessed 
continues this philosophy of instinctual dominance.  In this novel, Le Guin highlights the 
ways that the motivation of ownership and property leads to cultural acceptance of 
domination.  In both novels, dominance begins as vague hegemony and ends in ostensible 
abuse of land and people.  By juxtaposing two worlds, Le Guin takes her characters on 
introspective journeys during which their critical examination of new cultures leads them 
to question the mores of their own.      
Atwood’s early perspective on the anti-essentialism debate in ecofeminism as 
well as her analysis of technology as a tool for destruction remain major topics in 
contemporary ecofeminism.  In Surfacing, Atwood gives arguments for both using 
identification with nature to break away from male-focused environmental movements 
and denying the confining binaries of culture/nature, man/woman.  While Atwood 
recognizes the merit of both approaches, she ultimately decides that subjugated peoples 
cannot reclaim essentialism without falling into the trap of otherization.  Written thirty 
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years later, Oryx and Crake focuses less on essentialism and more on technology’s affect 
on human culture and history.  Again, Atwood recognizes both sides of the argument.  
Throughout human history technology has been used to save and improve life, and it has 
also been used for abuse and environmental destruction.  As with Le Guin, Atwood 
leaves the responsibility of technology to the constant vigilance of human care.  
Ecofeminism argues that the fate of all life is interconnected.   As the dominant 
life on earth, humans have a special responsibility to uphold an ethic of care that extends 
to both human and nonhuman life.  Through ecofeminist analyses of Le Guin and 
Atwood, this thesis has drawn connections between ecofeminism’s present and past.  The 
novels examined in this thesis chart the growth and interconnectivity of authors, theories, 
and events in ecofeminist history.  Le Guin encourages that we continuously rebel against 
the tyranny of human dominance while Atwood reminds us that human consciousness 
will lead us to the careful development of identity and technology.  These lessons help 
conceptualize ecofeminist philosophy and produce a more holistic understanding of 
where ecofeminism has been and where it is now.  Only with this perspective, may we 
intuit how ecofeminism will continue to develop and speculate what implications it will 
have for the future.    
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